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1 Introduction 
 
Since the article pioneering the concept of sports economy was published by 
Simon Rottenberg in 1956, academic studies of professional team sports have steadily 
expanded and gained attention, especially in the past two decades, when substantial 
increases in both the demand and supply of professional sport teams have combined 
with greater professionalism among stakeholders. Rottenberg’s (1956) uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis predicted that, other things being equal, closer competition between 
teams and across a professional sport league would increase spectators’ interest in the 
sport and attendance rates. Attendance strongly determines the revenues of professional 
sport teams and companies associated with the industry, and the increased demand and 
supply can be best illustrated with data from a single game, the 2014 World Cup Final 
in Brazil. The combined market value of the teams in the final, Argentina and Germany, 
amounted to €951 million.1 On average 53,592 spectators attended 64 World Cup 
games, for nearly 3.5 million attendees throughout the tournament. Even more 
impressive are the national and global television ratings: In Germany, they reached an 
all-time high, with a market share of 86.3% and 34.65 million spectators. Across the 
globe, an audience of more than 1 billion tuned in to this single game.
2
  
In addition to being extremely popular, the professional sports industry differs 
from any other. For example, a monopoly is neither a profitable nor a desirable state for 
market participants, because the final good is a joint production of the contestants in 
each league, single game, or contest (Neale, 1964). The stronger the contenders, the 
greater the profits are, in line with the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. To maintain 
                                                 
1
 AGF/GfK Fernsehpanel 13.07.2014. 
2
 Data obtained from www.transfermarkt.de, though the data on the final global television audience 
remains unofficial; http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/28278945 12.07.2014. 
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outcome uncertainty, sports economists cite the need for competitive balance; as many 
studies show, competitive balance correlates with attendance, such that attendance 
increases when competing teams are more evenly balanced (Forrest & Simmons, 2002; 
Krautmann & Hadley, 2006; Meehan, Nelson, & Richardson, 2007; Lee & Fort, 2008; 
Lee, 2009). Measures to maintain or even increase competitive balance include salary 
caps, revenue sharing, luxury taxes, reverse-order drafts, and exemptions from antitrust 
law, all which are predominantly applied in U.S. professional leagues (Fort & Quirk, 
1995; Szymanski, 2003).  
In European sports leagues, such policies were largely absent before 2009, when 
the administrative body of the European football association (UEFA) implemented its 
Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations. These regulations limit teams to spending no 
more than they earn, even those teams owned by wealthy owners who are willing to 
invest private money to strengthen their squads and whose habits had begun prompting 
most teams to overspend to remain competitive (Sass, 2012). Teams that fail to comply 
with these regulations face the threats of severe financial penalties, transfer bans, and 
exclusion from international competitions.  
Increasing regulations in turn force professional sport teams to strive even harder 
for superior organizational performance. The organizational goals and outcomes are 
much clearer for professional team sports than for companies in most other industries. 
Their key objectives, given their available resources, are sport success and business 
performance (Guzmán, 2006). Usually, better sport performance translates into greater 
revenues and profits for team owners (Frick & Simmons, 2008), but superior business 
performance depends not just on the organization’s resource endowment but also on the 
efficiency with which the team uses this endowment (Gerrard, 2005). This notion 
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resonates with the resource-based view (RBV), a popular theoretical model of how 
firms use their resources and capabilities strategically to achieve objectives in an 
efficient manner (Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Specifically, the 
RBV provides a framework for identifying, defining, and attaining a sustainable 
competitive advantage through the effective, efficient deployment of each firm’s rare, 
valuable resources, which are neither perfectly imitable nor substitutable without great 
effort (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). That is, the following four attributes of a resource 
must exist for a resource to enable above-normal economic rents: It must be valuable, 
rare, in-imitable and non-substitutable, as summarized by the VRIN model (Barney, 
1991): 
1. It must be valuable, in that it exploits opportunities or neutralizes threats in the 
firm’s environment. 
2. It must be rare among the firm’s current and potential competition. 
3. It must be imperfectly imitable. 
4. It must be non-substitutable, so there cannot be strategically equivalent 
substitutes that are valuable but neither rare nor imperfectly imitable. 
A resource is any asset, capability, organizational process, attribute, information, 
or knowledge controlled by a firm that enables it to conceive of and implement 
strategies to improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991).
3
 Thus, 
outperforming competitors requires more than the availability of resources; it also 
requires the firm to convert its own resources into effective processes. Consequently, 
                                                 
3
 A more general definition by Wernerfelt (1984) refers to a resource as anything that could be thought of 
as a strength of a given firm. 
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the ability to exploit resources better than competitors is a key competency (Reed & 
DeFillippi, 1990).  
As an extension of this view, the VRIO framework adds the consideration of 
whether the firm is appropriately organized to exploit the resource (Barney, 1995). The 
rationale for adding this factor is the notion that to realize the potential of a valuable, 
rare, and costly to imitate resource, the firm must be organized in such a way that it can 
capture that value, as determined by its formal reporting structure, management control 
systems, or compensation policies, for example (Barney, 1995).  
For professional sports teams, the human capital of their players represents both a 
primary resource and a key expense. However, players cannot be considered strategic 
resources, because an effective and regulated labor market exists for them. Rather, the 
abilities to identify future top players and recruit them, using superior scouting 
capabilities, represent competencies and resources that might lead to a competitive 
advantage. In addition, the ability to exploit market inefficiencies and sign players at 
prices below their marginal revenue contributions constitutes another strategic resource. 
Fritz (2006) cites several other resources and competencies that possess the potential to 
invoke competitive advantages, such as drawing potential, or the market potential that a 
given infrastructure produces. This market potential depends on various factors, 
including population, income per capita, and the history and reputation of the team. 
Finally, superior marketing capabilities, which might increase sponsorship revenues, 
and the competency to create effective player and coaching squads are resources with 
strong influences on sport and financial success. 
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This dissertation seeks to answer several research questions related to this field 
empirically. Accordingly, I have gathered data sets from various professional sports, 
including data about the team-level financial and sport performance of four North 
American major sport leagues: the National Basketball Association (NBA), National 
Hockey League (NHL), National Football League (NFL), and Major League Baseball 
(MLB), as well as from English Premier League (EPL) clubs. I use detailed individual 
player performance and salary data related to players in the German Bundesliga. My 
analyses also rely on game- and season-level data from the Spanish basketball top 
division Asociación de Clubs de Baloncesto (ACB). The financial performance data of 
professional sport teams are inherently scarce though. For the U.S. team sports, I 
gathered industry information about team values and revenues from Forbes Magazine. 
For European soccer teams, Forbes only reports team values for the 25 most valuable 
clubs, not entire national leagues. To analyze the financial performance of EPL clubs, I 
turned to data provided by Deloitte & Touche GmbH, which calculates and publishes 
revenues in its Annual Review of Football Finance Report.  
With these data, I start with an initial assessment of the uncertainty of outcome 
hypothesis in Chapter 2, by empirically detailing the trade-off between scoring and 
competitive balance in professional basketball. When it reduced the time of possession 
from 30 seconds to 24 seconds in 2000, the Spanish basketball federation sought to 
increase the speed and attractiveness of the game. Two main consequences should result 
from this rule change. First, the number of points scored per game should increase, due 
to the greater number of possessions and shot attempts. Second, competitive balance 
should decrease, because in any game, relative team inequality implies that an increase 
in possessions will enhance the chances of the better team to win. Using both game- and 
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season-level data from the Spanish professional league, Chapter 2 confirms that a 
resulting increase in scoring was accompanied by decreased competitive balance. This 
finding empirically reveals the trade-off between these two measures, both of which 
presumably could drive consumer demand. The implications are straightforward: If a 
sport’s governing body is tempted to increase the speed of the games, it faces a 
significant drawback, in the form of fewer surprising outcomes and less competitive 
balance, in conflict with recommendations derived from the uncertainty of outcome 
hypothesis.
4
  
Chapter 3 addresses the financial performance of NHL franchises, prior and after 
a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in 2005, which provides an unique setting 
in which to analyze the impact of a regulatory intervention on managerial efficiency. 
The new CBA followed the cancelled 2004–05 season, when team owners and the 
National Hockey League Players’ Association (NHLPA) could not reach agreement on 
a key point. Team owners demanded cost certainty, noting that player salaries consumed 
more than 65% of the generated revenues, whereas the NHLPA refused to install salary 
restrictions. The 2005 CBA introduced both salary regulations and revenue sharing to 
the NHL, in a bid to restore financial competitiveness. With these objectives, the key 
question is whether the new CBA actually improved efficiency. Using team values as 
the dependent variable, I show that an abrupt increase in technical efficiencies resulted 
from the CBA; in particular, poorly performing teams benefited from the newly 
introduced measures.
5
  
                                                 
4
 A version of this chapter, “The Trade-Off between High Scoring Games and Competitive Balance in 
Basketball,” has been submitted for publication consideration to Journal of Sport Economics 
(Büschemann & Deutscher, 2014).  
5
 A version of this chapter, “Did the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement Really Improve Team 
Efficiency in the NHL?” was published in International Journal of Sports Finance (Büschemann & 
Deutscher, 2011).  
Chapter 1: Introduction                
 
            7 
With Chapter 4, I extend the efficiency analysis to all North American major 
league franchises and clubs from the English Premier League, investigating the 
differences in motives between North American and European sport teams, as well as 
how sporting performance might differentially influence teams’ value and revenues. 
Prior literature suggests that North American team owners tend to be profit-maximizing 
business people, whereas European team owners are sportsmen and -women. Rather 
than maximize profits, the sporting group is willing to sacrifice profits to win, such that 
they ultimately become win maximizers who seek to win at any cost. Yet empirical 
evidence of this difference remains scarce. Chapter 4 constitutes the first study to 
analyze cross-continental empirical data and thereby close a research gap, as well as 
suggest a novel approach for analyzing the determinants of financial performance and 
the financial and athletic efficiency of professional sport teams. Using data related to 
162 teams’ financial and sport performance over nine consecutive seasons (i.e., 1,237 
team–season observations from 2001–02 to 2009–10), I show empirically that European 
teams value athletic achievements differently than do U.S. major league franchises, 
across several sports. The application of data envelopment efficiency analyses affirms 
these findings.
6
  
In Chapter 5, I turn to an analysis at the individual player level to identify 
determinants of wage dispersions across professional athletes. Several individual 
characteristics (e.g., age, experience, talent, position, team effects, country of origin, 
and especially average performance) likely determine player salaries. This chapter 
investigates how the consistency of professional soccer players’ performance might 
                                                 
6
 A version of this chapter, “Sports or Business Approach? A Cross-Continent Analysis of U.S. Major 
League Franchises and English Premier League Clubs” has been submitted for publication consideration 
to European Sports Management Quarterly (Büschemann, 2014). 
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affect their salaries. The data set encompasses 845 different players who played in the 
German Bundesliga between the 2005–06 and 2009–10 seasons, or 34,413 player–
match day observations. To measure performance consistency, I calculated a variation 
coefficient over each season using player evaluations compiled by experts and 
published in Kicker Sportmagazin, a highly respected soccer magazine. Strong 
empirical evidence indicates that a salary premium rewards players who exhibit 
performance volatility. Applying ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and quantile 
regression analyses to disentangle the influence of performance for different parts of the 
salary distribution, I show that this effect is robust.
7
 
Finally, Chapter 6 offers a broader focus and integrates another field of research, 
by analyzing the effects of environmental regulations on the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) patterns of German multinational enterprises. Along the lines of inquiry 
formulated by the so-called pollution haven hypothesis, a traditional economic view 
suggests that countries with low environmental monitoring and regulations attract 
multinational enterprises engaged in pollution-intensive production. Yet this hypothesis 
still lacks empirical support. The applied panel data set contains information about 
aggregated German outbound FDI and outbound FDI for selected industries from 2000 
to 2006. To test for a statistically significant relationship between German FDI and 
environmental regulations, I employed an environmental ranking published by the 
World Economic Forum for each year of the sample period. The results reveal that 
aggregated FDI is indeed redirected toward pollution havens, and this trend is especially 
evident in polluting industries such as the chemical industry. The results for the 
automotive industry show instead that FDI follows strict environmental regulations. 
                                                 
7
 A version of this chapter, “Does Performance Consistency Pay Off Financially for Players? Evidence 
from the Bundesliga,” appeared in Journal of Sport Economics (Deutscher & Büschemann, 2014). 
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These results support the Porter hypothesis and reveal that strong future market 
potential may create a bias against a pollution haven effect. 
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation by summarizing the results and providing an 
outlook for further research areas. 
Chapter 2: The Trade-Off between High Scoring Games and Competitive Balance in 
Basketball 
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2 The Trade-Off between High Scoring Games and Competitive 
Balance in Basketball  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In sport contexts, institutional rule changes often seek to level the playing field for 
teams or increase the attractiveness of the sport to consumers. In basketball for example, 
the U.S. National Basketball Association (NBA) sought to reduce the domination of 
physically superior players such as George Mikan or Wilt Chamberlain and increase 
competitive balance. Recent rule changes in European basketball leagues have 
prompted closer assimilation with the rules of the NBA, such as the 24-second shot 
clock. European basketball leagues adopted this rule in 2000, which represented a 
decrement from the previous time limit of 30 seconds. The goal was to increase the 
speed of the game and accordingly increase the number of possessions, which should 
have two main consequences: First, the number of points scored per game should 
increase, with the greater number of possessions and shot attempts. Second, competitive 
balance should decrease, because in any game, relative team inequality implies that the 
increase in possessions will enhance the chances of the better team to win: More 
repetitions reduce the impact of randomness on outcomes (Groot, 2009). The lessening 
impact of randomness in turn should reduce competitive balance across the league. 
With this study, we provide a novel empirical analysis of the trade-off between 
the pace of the game and competitive balance, across 20 seasons of Spanish basketball. 
We find that scoring improved significantly with the introduction of the shorter shot 
clock, but competitive balance decreased significantly. The finding offers advice to the 
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organizers of sports, especially for the open league system in Europe where regulations 
aiming to increase competitive balance are rather hard to imply. 
In the next section, we present an overview of studies that address competitive 
balance in team sports. The data for the empirical analysis and the empirical results 
appear in Section 3. We conclude with a discussion of these empirical results and an 
outlook on further research in Section 4. 
2.2 Competitive Balance and its Drivers  
Research into competitive balance in professional team sports has a long history, 
starting with Rottenberg’s (1956) uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. That is, in the 
absence of regulation policies, teams located in larger markets sign the most talented 
players, resulting in predictable match outcomes, which ultimately lead to lower 
attendance. Neale (1964) similarly argues for the economic importance of team parity in 
professional sports leagues, to maximize the profits earned by league participants. Most 
previous analyses focus on North American team sports, particularly Major League 
Baseball (MLB), and the effects of competitive balance on attendance. They offer 
consistent support for the hypothesis that attendance is higher when competing teams 
are more evenly balanced (Forrest & Simmons, 2002; Krautmann & Hadley, 2006; 
Meehan, Nelson, & Richardson, 2007; Lee & Fort, 2008; Lee, 2009). 
Sometimes unplanned changes affect competitive balance though. For example, 
following the judgment of the European Court of Justice in 1995 in the Bosman 
ruling—which pertained to whether players should be free to change teams when their 
contracts have expired—within-season competitive balance increased, according to 
Flores, Forrest, and Tena (2010). However, research into the effects of planned 
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institutional changes, including rule changes, on competitive balance remains sparse. 
Daly and Moore (1981) on the introduction of the MLB draft, and Croix and Kawaura 
(1999) on the implementation in the Japanese Professional Baseball league find that 
competitive balance improved after the introduction of a draft. Kent, Caudill, and 
Mixon (2013) examine the effects of three rule changes on competitive balance that 
occurred in 1958, 1970 and 1992 relating to player substitutions, to yellow card 
penalties and to back-pass delaying tactics of seven European professional soccer 
leagues, and find mixed evidence regarding match competitiveness, which they 
measured by the score differential. According to Mastromarco and Runkel’s (2009) 
empirical evidence, the Formula 1 organizational body frequently changes its rules to 
improve competitive balance and maximize profits. They assert that the number of rule 
changes depends on the competitive balance in the preceding season. Greater imparity 
in season t – 1 increases the probability of rule changes at the start of season t. 
Various measures might help maintain or increase competitive balance, such as 
salary caps, revenue sharing, luxury taxes, reverse draft order picks, and exemptions 
from antitrust law, most of which have been applied in major U.S. sport leagues (Fort & 
Quirk, 1995; Szymanski, 2003). In European sports leagues, prominent policies include 
financial fair play (FFP), as implemented by the UEFA, and a change in the point 
awarding system by European football. Sass (2012) predicts the long-term effects of the 
competitive balance resulting from FFP and finds a negative influence. The change in 
the point system (from a 2-1-0 to a 3-1-0 scheme) also appears to have promoted greater 
competitive imbalance (Haugen, 2008). 
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These studies explicitly measure the impacts of rule changes on competitive 
balance, without accounting separately for any impact of increased game speed on 
competitive balance. Yet rule changes generally aim to make the sport more attractive 
by increasing its pace, which simultaneously decreases competitive balance. With this 
empirical study, we propose a novel perspective on the trade-off that regulators face, 
between increasing the attractiveness of the game and maintaining competitive balance. 
2.3 Data and Results 
The data for this study comes from 20 seasons of the Spanish top division 
Asociación de Clubs de Baloncesto (ACB). The Spanish national team has performed 
well in international competition and also helped encourage successful league 
competition. Over the 20 seasons we consider, Spanish teams advanced to the finals of 
the Euroleague, the highest tier in professional basketball competition in Europe, 9 
times. The data span all games played between the 1990-91 and the 2009-10 season, or 
10 seasons before and 10 seasons after the introduction of the shorter shot clock in 
2000–01. In most of these seasons, the league featured 18 teams, each of which played 
all the others twice each season, providing 306 total observations. We gathered 
information about the final score of the game, game day, and opponents. By aggregating 
the regular season scores and comparing them against the final standings, we 
determined our competitive balance measures. Furthermore, to assess the impact of the 
shot clock change on scoring and competitive balance, we distinguished game-level and 
season-level measures for various time intervals. 
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2.3.1 Short, Mid- & Long-Term Effects 
In our estimations, we differentiate between short-, mid- and long-term effects. 
Rule changes might be anticipated by the teams´ general managers and affect their 
personnel decisions in advance; alternatively, higher scoring and lower competitive 
balance might exert influences only after the institutional change has been implemented. 
To specify the short-term effects, we consider one season prior and one season after the 
rule change; the mid-term effects refer to respectively three and five seasons before and 
after the institutional change; and to capture the long-term effects, we use the full range 
of observations, that is, ten seasons prior to and after the implementation of the reduced 
shot clock. Figure 2-1 illustrates the different observation periods.  
 
Figure 2-1: Observation periods surrounding the rule change in 2000 
2.3.2 Game-Level Measures 
The competitive balance measure, at an individual game level, depends on the 
closeness of the contest, as determined by the absolute difference in points scored. We 
assume that wins with a narrow margin are more appealing to spectators than games 
won by large margins. 
The absolute value of point differentials |𝑃𝐷| captures the closeness of the score 
of any single game; on average, these values across the 20 seasons in the sample range 
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between 9.3 and 12.1. Because our dependent variable |𝑃𝐷| mainly involves small, 
discrete values, we applied a Poisson regression (Greene, 2003). In addition, we 
captured the dynamics of each season with the variable “Gameday” serving as a counter 
for the round of matches within the season, and to control for the difference in ability 
between teams, we determine the absolute value difference between their ranks in the 
final table, using the variable DiffStanding.
8
 
We apply the following econometric model to determine the impact of the 
reduction of the shot clock: 
|𝑃𝐷| = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝜖 
 
Table 2-1: Poisson regression: Marginal effects on score differences 
| PD | Poisson Regression 
  1-Year Effect 3-Year Effect 5-Year Effect 10-Year Effect 
Shotclock 0.806*** 0.512*** 0.570*** 0.930*** 
Gameday -0.022+ -0.017+ -0.011** -0.018*** 
Diffstanding 0.424*** 0.392*** 0.379*** 0.295*** 
n 612 1835 3133 6038 
Pseudo R² 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance. 
 
According to the marginal effects for the estimations in Table 2-1, we find strong 
support for an immediate impact of the shot clock change on competitive balance. The 
short-term, one-year effect, which captures differences between seasons directly prior to 
and after the institutional change, indicates a significant increase of 0.8 in score 
difference. This result remains consistent for all time frames. 
                                                 
8
 The results for the shotclock variable do not change if we fail to include these control variables. 
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To measure the impact of the change on scoring, we ran a second regression to 
determine the drivers of points scored during a game (Total points): 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛
+ 𝜖 
The marginal effects for these estimations in Table 2-2 again confirm our 
predictions: The reduction of the shot clock led to an increase in the number of points 
scored. In the first season after the rule change the influence was especially noticeable, 
with an increase of 14 points per game. The long-term effects are less convincing but 
might reflect other factors that emerged over this long period. For example, basketball 
underwent a development toward greater professionalization during this time, which 
had effects on the league that are difficult to capture with other control variables. 
In both models the mean and the variance are approximately equal neglecting a 
potential problem from overdispersion in the empirical model. 
Table 2-2: Poisson regression: Marginal effects on total points scored 
| Totalpoints | Poisson Regression 
  1-Year Effect 3-Year Effect 5-Year Effect 10-Year Effect 
Shotclock 14.62*** 6.30*** 2.31*** -0.908+ 
Gameday -0.033+ -0.000+ -0.057** -0.081+ 
Diffstanding 0.156+ 0.211*** 0.113*** 0.067* 
n 612 1835 3133 6038 
Pseudo R² 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance. 
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2.3.3 Season-Level Measures 
At this level, the metrics we use to measure competitive balance reflect the final 
standings, including indices such as the Gini coefficient and Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index, as well as deviations in the win percentages. In addition, we consider two 
dimensions of competitive balance, related to the relative strength of teams in any given 
season (intra-seasonal balance) or over time (inter-seasonal balance). The most widely 
applied measure is the ratio of standard deviations (RSD), which controls for both 
season length and the number of teams (Fort, 2007). The RSD compares the actual 
standard deviation (ASD) of win percentages against the idealized standard deviation 
(ISD). Therefore, we compute RSD for a given season t as: 
𝑅𝑆𝐷 =  
𝐴𝑆𝐷
𝐼𝑆𝐷
 
 
where: 
𝑅𝑆𝐷 =
√∑
(𝑊𝑃𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 0.5)²
𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
0.5
√𝑁
 
Will N being the number of games each team plays per season, and .5 the win 
probability for any match in which both teams are equally strong. Greater competitive 
balance is indicated if the RSD value is lower. Using the final league tables, we measure 
the average win margin and points scored per match, to control for their effects on game 
attractiveness, and present the results in Table 2-3. 
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Table 2-3: Season-level measures of the effects of shot clock rule changes 
Short-Term-Effects Mid-Term Effects Long-Term Effects 
Season 
1-Year Effect 3-Year Effect 5-Year Effect 10-Year Effect 
t - 1 t + 1 in% t - 3 t + 3 in% t - 5 t + 5 in% t - 10 t + 10 in% 
Totalpoints  
per match 145 160 10% 154 160 4% 158 160 2% 159 157 -1% 
Win 
margin  
per match 
4.04 5.68 41% 4.18 4.99 20% 4.25 4.72 11% 4.00 4.63 16% 
Ratio of 
standard 
deviation 
1.64 2.31 40% 1.87 2.13 14% 1.95 2.01 3% 1.84 2.00 9% 
 
Immediately after the shot clock reduction, the points per match and win margins 
rose significantly, by 10% and 41%, respectively. Simultaneously, the competitive 
imbalance increased by 40%, though the effects diminished over subsequent seasons. 
These results affirm that an increase in game speed, and thus game attractiveness, is 
accompanied by a decline in competitive balance, which supports the predicted trade-off 
between these two outcomes. The contrasting long-term effects might reflect additional 
rule changes such as the change of the back-pass rule and the stricter interpretation of 
unsportsmanlike fouls implemented in 2008; the effect of the shot clock change cannot 
be separated precisely from other, potentially contrary effects. 
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
2.4.1 Limitations 
The estimation results offer convincing evidence of a trade-off between scoring 
and competitive balance, but the impacts on consumer demand can be derived only by 
relying on previous findings (Szymanski, 2001; Lee & Fort, 2008), because we do not 
have attendance data for the period we studied. In addition, many studies adopt betting 
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odds to determine the competitive balance of each game (Deutscher et al., 2013; Berger 
& Nieken, 2014), with an assumption about the efficiency of betting markets (Fama, 
1970; Levitt, 2004), which emerge as valid predictors of actual winning probabilities. 
Unfortunately, historic betting odds are unavailable. 
2.4.2 Implications 
This study has demonstrated a trade-off between high scoring games and 
competitive balance in professional basketball in Spain. Both game- and season-level 
data support the prediction that the reduction of the shot clock increased scoring but 
also decreased competitive balance. 
The results of the empirical analysis suggest some straightforward policy 
implications: If a sport’s governing body is tempted to increase the speed of the games, 
it faces a significant drawback, namely, fewer surprising outcomes and less competitive 
balance. Whereas major U.S. leagues already use instruments such as a rookie draft, 
salary caps, and revenue sharing, our findings suggest that these procedures are neither 
limitless nor necessarily successful (Szymanski & Kesenne, 2004). In the worst case 
scenario, they create incentives for teams to lose games intentionally, in pursuit of better 
chances of winning more games in subsequent seasons (Taylor & Trogdon, 2002; 
Soebbing, Humphreys, & Mason, 2013). In Europe, the results are even more 
noticeable. Its open league system, with promotion and relegation factors, creates a 
higher hurdle to new rules and regulations, which would affect a large number of clubs. 
Basketball is not the only sport that has adjusted its rules to increase the sport’s 
appeal. For example, table tennis increased the required number of sets to win but 
simultaneously reduced the number of points needed to win a set in 2001. In 1999, 
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volleyball revised its counting rules. Demand for these sports arguably is lower than 
that for basketball; it would be interesting for further research to investigate the extent 
to which these sports experienced effects similar to those that we have outlined here. 
Additional research also could investigate another potential positive outcome of 
the rule change. That is, sports participation might shift due to rule changes that 
encourage faster, more entertaining games. To test this prediction, researchers could 
solicit pertinent data from sport federations linked to the development of active 
members.  
 
 
  
Chapter 3: Did the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement Really Improve Team 
Efficiency in the NHL?                
 
            21 
3 Did the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement Really Improve 
Team Efficiency in the NHL?  
 
3.1 Introduction 
At the end of the 2003-04 season, the National Hockey League (NHL) faced 
serious financial challenges. Player salaries consumed more than 65% of the generated 
revenues. Hence, more than 20 of the 30 teams were claiming monetary losses. Small 
market teams in particular suffered from the steady increase in player salaries; they 
were unable to compete with big market teams for top players and their generous player 
contracts. In addition, attendance figures decreased to a 4-year low. Consequently, top 
free agents were signed by teams with large revenue streams, many of which were 
located in big markets. There was no new agreement between the team owners and the 
National Hockey League Players’ Association (NHLPA) in sight when the 1995 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expired. Team owners demanded cost certainty 
for their teams, whereas the NHLPA initially refused to accept salary restrictions in 
terms of a salary cap. Subsequently, a novelty in hockey sport history occurred when 
the team owners announced a lockout and eventually cancelled the entire 2004-05 
season. A new agreement was reached in July 2005 and contained several novelties, 
including a hard payroll cap as well as a revenue sharing plan. The ultimate goal of 
these measures was to restore financial competitiveness, which as it is proposed, should 
a priori help financially weak teams to be more competitive. In detail, the CBA includes 
a salary cap as well as a salary floor. Also, the revenue sharing plan is intended to allow 
low revenue teams to be more financially competitive. In order to do this, the top ten 
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teams contribute money to a pool where a minimum of 4.5% of league revenues are to 
be distributed among the bottom 15 teams. 
In order to analyze the financial situation of NHL teams before and after the CBA, 
and to measure the impact of the CBA, this chapter applies stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA). The objective is to provide empirical evidence on whether or not the new CBA 
did indeed improve financial competitiveness. These impacts of an institutional change 
can be best observed by analyzing the team efficiency. The methodology has been 
widely used in the field of sports economics. The most popular choice of output 
indicators used in the existing literature has been the sporting performance (measured as 
wins), winning percentage, or points achieved in a given season. For European soccer, 
Dawson, Dobson, and Gerrard (2000) applied SFA to estimate the efficiency of 
managers in English professional soccer. In addition, Frick and Simmons (2008) used 
SFA to measure the effect of variations in managerial compensation on team success in 
the German Bundesliga. Barros and colleagues (Barros, Del Corral, & Garcia-del-
Barrio, 2008; Barros, Garcia-del-Barrio, & Leach, 2009) analyzed technical efficiency 
of football clubs in the Spanish Primera Division as well as in the English Premier 
League with a random frontier model. Concerning U.S. team sport franchises Zak, 
Huang, and Siegfried (1979) were the first to analyze efficiencies of 5 NBA teams with 
a Cobb-Douglas deterministic frontier model. Hofler and Payne (1997) extended this 
approach and examined a cross-sectional analysis of all 27 NBA teams for the 1992-93 
season in order to observe if teams play up to their potential in terms of actual wins. In a 
subsequent study, Hofler and Payne (2006) used panel data for the stochastic production 
frontier model. 
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In a different strand of literature, Kahane (2005) applied SFA for the NHL and 
identifies technical inefficiency in production. His results indicate that franchises owned 
by corporations tend to be more efficient than franchises owned by individuals, and 
teams with a greater relative presence of French-Canadian players tended to be less 
efficient. In a similar direction, Fort, Lee, and Berri (2008) applied SFA to address the 
issue on discrimination in retention of NBA coaches and detected no difference in 
technical efficiency by race of the coach. 
Because team owners postulated over ways to reach cost certainty through the 
2005 NHL CBA, it seems to be obvious that team owners are not solely interested in 
success on the ice and the glory of victory. From the team owners´ perspective, it is 
imperative that the franchise achieves a positive return of their investment. The present 
study explores the relationship between the 2005 NHL CBA and financial success of 
franchise teams relative to their potential. By using team values, as well as franchises´ 
revenues, as outputs to measure technical efficiencies, the study focuses on economic 
efficiency. Previous studies, as shown above, predominantly used sporting performance 
as the output variable for measuring team success. But a sport, even though advocated 
differently on a regular basis, is not just about winning games. The franchise system of 
the NHL-which, as stated above, struggled heavily right before the lockout-has to make 
sure that teams operate efficiently, in terms of financial performance, to ensure the 
future of the league. Because of this, we deviate from the existing literature by 
introducing financially important outcome variables. 
One method has been ignored in the literature so far: using team values as well as 
revenues as outputs for measuring technical efficiencies. Thus, the current research is 
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innovative in this context. Efficiency can also be used as a direct benchmark between 
franchises operating in the same institutional environment. Our article closes this gap 
through the analysis of the impact of the new CBA on efficiency; specifically, team 
value maximization and value generation of low performing teams immediately 
increased efficiencies after the lockout. 
3.2 Data Description 
The data set we used includes information on the four seasons prior to the lockout, 
from 2000-01 to 2003-04, and the four seasons immediately following the lockout, from 
2005-06 to 2008-09. At the beginning of the 2000-01 season, the NHL expanded from 
28 to 30 teams as the Minnesota Wild and the Columbus Blue Jackets joined the league. 
Because we took the previous season into account, the resulting (unbalanced) panel data 
set contained 238 observations on all variables included in the estimates. 
Frontier models require identifying inputs and outputs. In order to determine how 
efficiently the franchises operated, it was essential for us to use a financial ratio as the 
output. Forbes magazine reports data annually on sport franchise´s team values, as well 
as revenues for all major leagues. It breaks down franchise valuation into four 
categories: sport, market, stadium, and brand management. Team value has been 
previously applied as a dependent variable to analyze determinants of franchise values 
(Alexander & Kern 2004; Humphreys & Mondello, 2008). Therefore, as franchise 
values are not equally distributed, this study applied the natural logarithm of team 
values as output. Furthermore, to ensure the robustness of our results, we used the 
natural logarithm of revenues for each franchise as a second output. This data is also 
published by Forbes magazine on a yearly basis. 
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The input variables represented the various factors that were most likely to 
determine a team´s franchise value. Therefore, we included the natural logarithm of the 
population of each team´s metropolitan area in order to account for market-size effects 
on franchise values. In metropolitan areas with more than one NHL franchise (e.g., Los 
Angeles and New York), each franchise was credited with the entire population in the 
metropolitan area—this is because the market cannot be unambiguously separated 
between each franchise. Data were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis´ Regional Economic Accounts and Statistics, Canada. Since franchises share 
larger pools of potential fans, we expected a positive relationship between teams located 
in larger markets and franchise values as well as revenues. It should be noted that, 
unlike in European soccer, only very few fans join their favorite teams for road games. 
This is due in part to a greater number of games and a lengthier distance between 
competing teams. 
The team´s stadium is another important input factor for multiple reasons. A 
franchise with a new stadium can expect higher revenues, and hence higher team values 
due to e.g. state-of-the-art luxury boxes, for example. Alexander and Kern (2004) and 
Miller (2007) identified that new sport stadiums experience a honeymoon effect, where 
attendees visit the stadium for the stadium and not necessarily to watch the team, which 
lasts between 6 to 10 years after inauguration. Hence, we included stadium age, as well 
as stadium age in quadratic form, in our analysis and expected a negative impact of 
arena age and an increase in marginal returns on both dependent variables. Data on 
arena age was collected from Munsey and Suppes´ website (http://www.ballparks.com). 
In addition, the natural logarithm of attendees per game was included. We assumed that, 
since each attendee generates revenues for the franchise, the higher the number of 
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attendees, the greater the team value. To measure this revenue stream, we used the team 
marketing annual reports from the Fan Cost Index (FCI), which are constructed for each 
franchise and year.
9
 The FCI tracks the cost of attending a sporting event for a family of 
four.
10
 The more a franchise is able to charge for their tickets and other amenities, the 
more revenues it generates. Thus, we presumed that the coefficient for the FCI would 
also be positively related to the team value. To analyze how franchise history affects 
team value, we included the duration of a team in the league and the squared duration of 
a team in the league. We expect that teams with a longer franchise history also report a 
higher team value.
11
 
We also control for the athletic achievements of a team. Since NHL standings are 
based on points and not wins, the rank is not expressed in terms of winning percentages; 
this is because teams receive a point for an overtime loss. We estimated athletic 
achievement by dividing the team´s total in the previous season by the average points of 
all teams in the previous season. Following the approach by Miller (2007), points 
achieved in the previous season are considered to be an important component in 
determining ticket prices, season ticket sales, media revenues, and advertising prices. 
We expected a positive coefficient, suggesting that a better athletic achievement in the 
previous season leads to higher revenues and, therefore, a higher franchise value. One of 
the most important input factors in professional sports is team expenses. We measure 
these by including the natural logarithm of the team payroll in our analysis. Data were 
drawn from USA Today 
                                                 
9
 Information is available at Rodney Fort’s website at http://www.rodneyfort.com. 
10
 The FCI comprises the prices of four average-price tickets, two small draft beers, four small soft drinks, 
four regular-size hot dogs, parking for one car, two game programs and two least-expensive, adult-size 
adjustable caps. 
11
 We did not include the natural logarithm of the input variables Duration and Age Arena since the value 
of 0 is not defined. 
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(http://content.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/salaries/default.aspx). We assumed that 
a team with high payroll expenses will offer a superior team quality and, therefore, 
provides a superior utility to fans. Due to this assumption, we anticipated that higher 
team expenses would positively influence the team´s value. All monetary magnitudes in 
this analysis (e.g., team value, FCI, payroll) were deflated by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), which was taken from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and expressed at prices 
for the year 2000. Descriptive statistics for all variables introduced above are shown in 
Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: Descriptive Statistics of indicators influencing team values 
Variable Operationalization Mean Min. Max. 
Log Value Natural log of the team value in Dollar 18.88 18.18 19.78 
Log Population Natural log of metropolitan area population 15.13 13.64 16.76 
Age Arena Tenure of the team in the arena 12.38 0 47 
Age Arena² Squared tenure of the team in the arena 270.0 0 2209 
Duration Duration of the team in the league 34.45 0 99 
Duration² Squared duration of the team in the league 1,964 0 9,801 
Relative Points 
Achieved points in previous season/average 
points 
1 0.45 1.37 
Log Attendance Natural log of attendance 9.72 9.18 9.97 
Log FCI Natural log of fan cost index 5.46 4.98 5.98 
Log Pay Natural log of team payroll 17.40 16.28 18.11 
 
3.3 Empirical Analyses of Efficiencies 
We applied a stochastic production frontier model to explore whether the new 
CBA did indeed improve technical efficiencies among the teams in the league. In the 
present study, the output of the teams in the NHL was measured by the team values as 
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well as revenues after the respective season. To compute technical efficiencies, we 
applied the model introduced by Battese and Coelli (1995), which allows for time-
varying efficiencies. It assumes a log-linear production function for a set of 𝑖 firms over 
𝑡 time-periods and can be expressed as follows:12 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + (𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡), 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇,            (1) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the franchise value, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of team-specific 
input quantities, and 𝛽 is a vector of unknown coefficients over which the likelihood 
will be maximized. Furthermore, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 represents a random error term that is assumed to 
be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2). 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is i.i.d. and a non-
negative random error term that accounts for technical inefficiency in production, and is 
further assumed to follow a normal distribution truncated at zero of the 𝑁(𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
distribution. 𝑚𝑖𝑡 is given as 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜎,              (2) 
𝑧𝑖𝑡 is a vector of variables that may influence the efficiency as team value creation, and 
is a vector to be estimated. Using data from the NHL from 2000-01 to 2008-09, we 
accomplished a total of 238 observations for 30 teams. Table 3-2 presents the maximum 
likelihood estimate for our frontier model for franchise values, while Table 3-3 presents 
results for revenue generation. All results are robust and not vulnerable to either 
multicollinearity or heteroskedasticity. 
                                                 
12
 The applied software for the frontier analysis is Stata11 SE. 
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Table 3-2: Stochastic Frontier Estimate for the dependent variable log(Value) 
Variable Coefficients t-Value 
Log Population .1076 7.36*** 
Age Arena -.0130 -3.25*** 
Age Arena² .0003 3.24*** 
Duration -.0018 -1.00+ 
Duration² .0001 3.62*** 
Relative Points .1100 1.46+ 
Log Attendance .7048 7.00*** 
Log FCI .1333 1.94* 
Log Pay .2955 5.84*** 
Number of obs. 238 
Log likelihood 86.5 
Chi square 681.83 
Probability 0.000 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance. 
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Table 3-3: Stochastic Frontier Estimate for the dependent variable log(Revenue) 
Variable Coefficients t-Value 
Log Population .0467 3.63*** 
Age Arena -.0067 -1.86* 
Age Arena² .0002 2.06** 
Duration -.0032 -1.97** 
Duration² .0001 4.03*** 
Relative Points -.0432 -0.62+ 
Log Attendance .7718 8.43*** 
Log FCI -.0793 -1.29+ 
Log Pay .3609 7.65*** 
Number of obs. 238 
Log likelihood 107.4 
Chi square 505.44 
Probability 0.000 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance. 
The coherence of the metropolitan area population and both dependent variables 
was as expected: Market size indeed showed a positive impact. It was not a surprise that 
both variables—the age of the arena and the squared age—were significant. Although 
both significance levels were different for the models, both dependent variables 
decreased as the years played in the facility increase—that is, the arena is not 
considered to be state-of-the-art after a few seasons, which again reduces fan interest. 
The positive impact of the squared term can be attributed to relatively old stadiums 
accommodating nostalgic memories of team history; Madison Square Garden in New 
York City, for example, is a historic arena, while not belonging to the most modern 
arenas in the league, still arouses spectators´ interest. As duration in the NHL depicts 
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the tradition of a team, only the squared term significantly impacted both dependent 
variables. This can be explained by team tradition, which cannot be established within a 
short period of time. The negative effect of duration on the nonquadratic term can be 
explained by the honeymoon effect, which diminished after the inauguration.
13
 
Although these indicators of arena and team history had the expected impact, sporting 
performance in the previous season apparently has not—that is, it did not impact team 
value or revenues in a significant way. In our model, both indicators for match day 
revenues affected our dependent variables in a positive way: Average attendance and 
the FCI exhibit statistically significant impacts. Finally, the team payroll-depicting team 
quality and serving as an indicator for the asset the squad displays—has the expected 
positive impact on both team values and revenue. 
After providing insights on indicators influencing team values in the NHL, and 
establishing a basis for calculating efficiencies for each team and each season, we 
pursued the initial inquiry to determine whether the lockout in 2004-05 improved these 
efficiencies.  
Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 provide information on the average efficiencies for a 
particular season on the 10 most efficient teams, the 10 least efficient teams, and the 8-
10 teams in between. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 The honeymoon effect is an increase in attendance after the opening of a new facility which fades after 
some time. For literature in major league sports see for example Leadley & Zygmont (2005, 2006) or 
Scully (1989). 
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Figure 3-1: Team efficiencies prior to and after the Lockout for the dependent variable log(Value) 
 
Figure 3-2: Team efficiencies prior to and after the Lockout for the dependent variable log(Revenue) 
One can easily observe that efficiencies increased immediately after the lockout 
season, providing clear support for the hypothesis that the new CBA indeed increased 
efficiencies. In particular, the low performing teams took advantage of the new CBA to 
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close the gap to the high performing teams. This is true for both models, as average 
efficiency for the 10 least efficient teams improved from 0.73 to 0.84 for Model 1, and 
from 0.72 to 0.86 for Model 2. Once the new CBA was established, average efficiencies 
leveled off around 7% higher than before the lockout for Model 1 and approximately 
9% higher than before the lockout for Model 2. The expectation stated in the 
introduction, which claims a strengthened competitiveness due to the new CBA, was 
supported by our estimations. 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the impact of the new CBA on efficiencies 
concerning maximizing team values as well as revenue generation. After the lockout 
season in 2004, we observed an abrupt increase in technical efficiencies after the new 
collective bargaining agreement was installed—particularly concerning low performing 
teams benefitting from salary restrictions and revenue sharing. 
As our study is the first to use team values and revenues in connection with 
measuring technical efficiencies of teams, several follow-up questions arise: For 
example, it would be of great interest to explore if team efficiencies benefit or suffer 
from having another major league team in the city; in other words, analyzing whether a 
tougher competition in a local market would serve as a catalyzer and lead to an increase 
in managerial performance. Going into more detail, it would be interesting to see if 
certain combinations of teams from the major league teams could serve as substitutes or 
complements. As our analysis provides a somewhat surprising result that sporting 
performance neither influences team values nor team revenues, future research could 
compare other major leagues to examine its potential influence in other sports. 
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4 Sport or Business Approach? A Cross-Continent Analysis of U.S. 
Major League Franchises and English Premier League Clubs  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The question of which primary objectives drive professional sport teams has long 
been controversial among sports economists. A popular strand of predominately U.S. 
literature adopts the profit maximisation hypothesis, such as in early theoretical models 
by Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964) that regard individual teams or leagues as firms 
that seek to increase their profits (see also El-Hodiri & Quirk, 1971; Fort & Quirk, 
1995; Falconieri, Palomino, & Sákovics, 2004). In contrast, Sloane (1971) provides one 
of the earliest arguments that European clubs favor wins rather than profits (Rascher, 
1997; Késsene, 1999, 2000, 2006; Zimbalist, 2003; Vrooman, 2007). These descriptions 
have prompted a broad classification, by which North American team owners are profit-
maximising business people, whereas European team owners are said to be sportsmen 
and -women (Fort, 2000; Cain & Haddock, 2005). Rather than maximise profits, the 
sporting group sacrifices profits to win and ultimately become win maximisers who 
literally seek to win at any cost (Vrooman, 2007).  
A more recent hybrid argument suggests that clubs maximise a weighted sum of 
profits and wins (Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2011). Although two empirical studies 
indicate that clubs trade off points and wins (Atkinson, Stanley, & Tschirhart, 1988; 
Garcia-del-Barrio & Szymanski, 2009), empirical evidence remains scarce, and no 
cross-continent empirical analysis of North American and European clubs has detailed 
their distinct economic behaviours or motives contribute to clarify the debate. In 
response, the current study seeks to both close the research gap and suggest a novel 
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approach for analysing the determinants of financial performance and the technical 
financial and athletic efficiency of North American major league sports and English 
Premier League football (i.e., soccer) teams, using parallel data sets. Information about 
nine consecutive seasons, from 2001-02 to 2009-10, covers 162 teams from North 
America’s National Hockey League (NHL), National Basketball Association (NBA), 
National Football League (NFL), and Major League Baseball (MLB), as well as the 
English Premier League (EPL), producing a total of 1,237 team-season observations. As 
measures of financial performance, this study uses Forbes’ franchise valuations for the 
major league clubs and Deloitte’s Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte & 
Touche, 2001-2009) to gather the annual revenues of the EPL clubs. In terms of 
technical efficiency, this research relies on either winning percentages (NBA, NFL, and 
MLB) or points per season (NHL and EPL) as a measure of athletic performance. In 
turn, it offers, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first empirical assessment of 
the profit and win maximisation hypotheses that combines panel regressions with data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) in a cross-continental data set. 
The results reveal several distinct motives of professional sport teams. In 
particular, athletic achievement exerts an effect on teams’ financial performance only 
among EPL teams, not across the North American major league franchises. The 
outcomes of the DEA also indicate that the motives driving the major league franchises 
tend to be more business oriented, whereas the rationale for the EPL clubs is to 
maximise their sporting performance.  
The next section proceeds with reviews of the existing literature pertaining to the 
determinants of franchise value and the use of efficiency analyses in professional sports 
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contexts. Following a brief discussion of the applied data, this study specifies the model 
and presents the results from the empirical analysis. It concludes with a discussion of 
the empirical results and limitations, along with an outlook on further research. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Empirical research into the value of professional sport clubs remains nascent, with 
just a few exceptions. For example, Humphreys and Lee (2010) and Humphreys and 
Mondello (2008) analyse franchise sale prices in the four North American Major 
Leagues. Emphasising the determinants of team value and revenues, Alexander and 
Kern (2004) find that the income levels and population of the local market, as well as 
the presence of new facilities and a strong regional identity, influence franchise values 
for major league teams. Miller (2007) studies MLB, and Miller (2009) investigates the 
NBA, NFL, and NHL, to extend these approaches and include facility and franchise 
age, public or private ownership, and duration of the franchise in the city. Büschemann 
and Deutscher (2011) also incorporate NHL team payrolls, attendance per game, and a 
fan cost index in their analysis. Scelles, Helleu, Durand, and Bonnal (2013) offer the 
first comparison of the determinants of franchise values between the North American 
major leagues and European soccer teams, using the aforementioned set of variables, 
though they include the team values of only a subset of the 20 most valuable pan-
European teams, as published by Forbes, which suggests the potential for a selection 
bias. Table 4-1 contains an overview of previous literature and the relevant empirical 
findings. 
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Table 4-1: Literature on determinants of franchise values 
Author(s) Data 
Model and Dependent 
Variable 
Empirical Findings 
Scelles et. al 
(2013) 
1,130 team-season observations 
of all major league teams, and 
185 European soccer team-
season observations, 2004-2011  
Panel regression with fixed 
time effects and natural 
logarithm of franchise values 
Positive influence of historical sporting performance for all 
major leagues and European soccer; contradictory results for 
population, income, attendance and sporting performance in 
t – 1 
Büschemann & 
Deutscher (2011) 
Sample of 238 NHL teams 
from 2000-01 to 2008-09 
(except 2004-05 due to lock-
out) 
Stochastic frontier analysis 
with natural logarithm of 
franchise values and revenue 
Metropolitan population, team payroll, game attendance, and 
new facilities increase franchise values; sporting 
performance in t – 1 and team duration have no significant 
impacts 
Humphreys & Lee 
(2010) 
Sample of 275 franchise sales 
in the four major leagues from 
1960 to 2009 
Repeat sales model 
(generalized least squares) 
with natural logarithm of 
franchise sales price 
No upward trend in sales prices; market income, population, 
facility characteristics, and on-field success positively 
influence franchise values 
Miller (2009) Sample of 1,080 NBA, NFL, 
and NHL team-season 
observations from 1991 to 2005 
Fixed-effects regression with 
natural logarithm of franchise 
value 
Local per capita income, sporting performance in t – 1, and 
private ownership (only NHL) have positive impacts; 
metropolitan population and duration of teams are not 
significant  
Humphreys & 
Mondello (2008) 
Sample of 173 franchise sales 
from 1969 to 2006 
Hedonic price model with 
natural logarithm of franchise 
sales price 
Empirical findings indicate that market values are better 
predicted by expert evaluations. Goals and assists have no 
significant impact; players’ popularity influences their 
market values 
Miller (2007) Sample of 338 MLB team-
season observations from 1990 
to 2002 
Random effects regressions 
with natural logarithm of 
franchise value 
Empirical evidence that metropolitan population, sporting 
performance in t and t – 1, and a new facility, regardless of 
how it was financed, positively influences team values 
Alexander & Kern 
(2004) 
Sample of 680 team-season 
observations from 1991 to 1997 
from all four major leagues (cf. 
Canadian teams) 
Ordinary least squares and 
fixed-effects regression with 
franchise value 
Market size, team performance, and new facilities increase 
franchise values. Regional identity, approximated by team 
name (e.g., Tennessee Titans instead of Nashville Titans), is 
only significant for MLB teams; income has a negative 
impact for NHL and NBA and a positive one for NFL  
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To analyse differences in the motives of owners across countries, this research 
proposes a nonparametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) as a means to measure 
efficiency in terms of financial and sporting performance. Prior literature features two 
approaches to efficiency measures, either DEA or a parametric approach, as exemplified 
by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The main argument in support of DEA is its 
applicability even with a relatively small sample size (Barros & Leach, 2006; Jardin, 
2009; Barros, Assaf & Sá-Earp, 2010). However, unlike SFA, no well-developed 
statistical tests for DEA exist to validate the specifications of a particular model. 
Considering though that DEA has been applied in many research fields, including 
agriculture (Picazo-Tadeo, Gomez-Limon, & Reig-Martinez, 2011), environmental 
economics (Roghanian & Foroughi, 2010), and public services (Alexander, Haug, & 
Jaforullah, 2010), and the small sample size mandated by the EPL with its 20 teams per 
season, the DEA approach seems most appropriate.  
Fizel and D´Itri (1997) apply DEA to sports economics to measure the individual 
efficiency of college basketball coaches. More recent applications of DEA techniques 
include analyses of sporting and financial performance in European soccer leagues; for 
example, Barros and Garcia-del-Barrio (2011), Picazo-Tadeo and Gonzalez-Gomez 
(2010), and Guzman (2006) study the Spanish Primera División; Guzman and Morrow 
(2007), Barros and Leach (2006), and Haas (2003a) investigate the EPL; Kounetas 
(2013) studies the Greek Super League; Jardin (2009) focuses on the French Ligue 1; 
and Espitia-Escuer and García-Cebrián (2010) address participants in the UEFA 
Champions League. The primary objective of these studies was to examine sporting and 
financial efficiency and provide benchmarks against peers as the summary in Table 4-2 
reveals.
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Table 4-2: Literature on data envelopment analysis in sport 
Author(s) Data Applied Model  Inputs Output(s) 
Kounetas (2013) 14 Greek Super League 
clubs from 2000 to 2008 
Bootstrap DEA and 
truncated regression 
Transfer expenses, contract renewals, 
operational costs, profits, age, location, 
and goal ratio 
Points and attendance 
Barros & Garcia-del-
Barrio (2011) 
12 Primera Division 
clubs, from 1996-97 to 
2003-04 
Bootstrap DEA and 
truncated regression 
Operational costs, team payroll, and 
total assets 
Attendance and other receipts 
Barros et al. (2010) 20 Brazilian football 
clubs from 2006 to 2007 
Bootstrap DEA and 
truncated regression 
Operational costs, team payroll and 
total assets 
Attendance and other receipts 
Espitia-Escuer & García-
Cebrián (2010) 
32 teams per season in 
Champions League from 
2003 to 2007 
Modified DEA, version 
by Anderson & Peterson 
(1993) 
Attacking plays, squad size, and ball 
possession 
Goal attempts and number of 
appearances in UEFA 
Champions League 
Picazo-Tadeo & 
Gonzalez-Gomez (2010) 
20 Primera Division 
football teams per 
season from 2001–02 to 
2007–08 
DEA Squad size, duration in national first 
division, and attendance 
Points 
Jardin (2009) 14 Ligue 1 football clubs 
from 2004-05 to 2006-
07 
DEA Payroll and metropolitan population Points and turnovers 
Guzman & Morrow 
(2007) 
115 EPL team-season 
obervations from 1997-
98 to 2002-03 
DEA with canonical 
correlation analysis 
Team payroll and director’s 
remuneration 
Points and total revenue 
Barros & Leach (2006) 12 EPL teams from 
1998-99 to 2002-03 
DEA Squad size, payroll, net assets, and 
stadium facilities expenditure 
Points, attendance, and 
turnover 
Guzman (2006) 14 Primera Division 
teams from 2000-01 to 
2002-03 
DEA and Malmquist 
productivity index 
Payroll and general expenses Turnover 
Haas (2003a) 20 EPL teams for the 
season (2000-01) 
DEA Payroll, coach salary, and metropolitan 
population 
Points, attendance, and 
revenue 
Haas (2003b) 12 Major League Soccer 
teams in 2000 
DEA Payroll, coach salary, and capacity 
utilization  
Points, attendance, and 
revenue 
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Somewhat surprisingly, analyses of the financial efficiency of North American 
sport leagues remain rare, with the exceptions of Haas (2003b, Major League Soccer) 
and Büschemann and Deutscher (2011, NHL). Instead, most of these studies focus on 
the efficiency of sporting performance, measured as winning percentage or points in a 
given season (Porter & Scully, 1982; Scully, 1994; Hadley, Poitras, Ruggiero, & 
Knowles, 2000; Einolf, 2004; Hofler & Payne, 2006; Lewis, Sexton, & Lock, 2007). No 
research addresses cross-continent comparisons. 
4.3 Data set and Descriptive Statistics 
The analysed data set contains information about nine seasons of four North 
American major league franchises and all teams participating in the EPL, though the 
data for the NHL only span eight seasons, due to the 2004-05 lock-out. In total, 32 
NBA, 32 NFL, 30 NHL, 31 MLB, and 37 EPL teams appear in the data set, yielding for 
1,237 team-season observations. During the observed period, four franchises relocated 
permanently (Montreal Expos, Vancouver Grizzlies, Charlotte Hornets, and Seattle 
Supersonics) and thus were treated as new observations, because the franchises began 
operating in a different market and played in new facilities. The analysis of the 
determinants of financial performance required the use of a financial ratio as the 
dependent variable. Forbes magazine provides sport franchises’ annual team values for 
all major leagues, departed into four categories: sport, market, stadium, and brand 
management. It recently has begun to publish team values for European soccer clubs 
too, but it includes only the 25 most valuable European teams and does not specify 
valuations for particular leagues. Because of this data constraint, the current study relies 
on revenues, instead of franchise values, for EPL clubs. Vine (2004) and Fort (2006) 
further argue that the Forbes values generally represent a simple multiple of revenues 
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by some factor, between 3 and 5.5, so the results should be comparable across the 
different analysis methods. The EPL data were available in Deloitte’s Annual Review of 
Football Finance (Deloitte & Touche, 2001-2009). Because franchise values and 
revenues are not normally distributed, this study applies the natural logarithm of team 
values and revenues. 
The explanatory variables represent various factors that prior studies have 
suggested are likely determinants of franchise values and revenues. The natural 
logarithm of the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) population and SMSA 
per capita income both control for market size effects. Teams located in larger, possibly 
wealthier markets have access to a larger pool of potential fans and thus enjoy 
favourable positions in terms of negotiating more lucrative cable television contracts or 
increasing gate receipts and game-day revenues. In metropolitan areas with more than 
one team (e.g., Los Angeles, New York, London), the entire population in the 
metropolitan area gets assigned to each team, because it is impossible to unambiguously 
separate the market across the multiple teams. Ultimately, a positive relationship is 
likely among population, income, and team values (Alexander & Kern, 2004; Miller, 
2009; Scelles et al., 2013). The major league data came from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, which produces Regional Economic Accounts, and Statistics 
Canada; the EPL data came from the Office for National Statistics. 
Team stadiums also constitute important factors. A team with a new stadium can 
expect higher revenues, from the sale of luxury suites and enhanced concession 
revenues (Miller, 2007; Scelles et al., 2013). Therefore, facility age should have a 
negative sign indicating a positive effect of new opened arenas on team values; the 
Chapter 4: Sport or Business Approach? A Cross-Continent Analysis of U.S. Major 
League Franchises and English Premier League Clubs                
 
 42 
relevant data came from http://www.stadiumguide.com and http://www.ballparks.com. 
Another age variable, namely, the duration of a team in the league, accounts for how 
team history affects team values. A relegation and promotion system exists only in 
European football, so for the EPL teams, this study uses total duration in the first 
division. In general though, teams with a longer team history should report higher team 
values.  
In addition, by including the natural logarithm of attendees per game, this study 
acknowledges that more attendees should increase team value, because each attendee 
generates revenue. Attendance relates to but is distinct from another potentially 
influential variable, namely, sporting performance in the previous season (Alexander & 
Kern; 2004; Miller, 2007). This performance influences ticket prices, season ticket 
sales, media revenues, and advertising prices. The measure of performance reflects the 
athletic achievements of the entire team; Winning percentage is included to control for 
this effect. NHL and EPL standings are based on points, not wins (e.g., a team gains a 
point for an overtime loss in the NHL or for a draw in EPL), so for these leagues, 
sporting performance equals the ratio of points achieved by the team in the previous 
season, divided by the average points of all teams in the previous season. The effect of a 
strong performance in the previous season on franchise values and team revenues 
should be greater for win-maximising teams (EPL) than for revenue-maximising teams 
(all other teams). 
The salaries paid to players average at least 50% of total team expenses and are 
therefore a key determinant and potential differentiating factor. Including the natural 
logarithm of the team payroll in the analysis reflects the assumption that higher 
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expenses lead to superior team quality, which has more utility for fans. That is, higher 
team expenses should enhance team value. Salary data were obtained from Rodney 
Fort’s Sports Business Data for all major league franchises and Deloitte’s Annual 
Review of Football Finance for EPL clubs. Any monetary variables (i.e., team values, 
revenues, payroll, and income) are deflated by the Consumer Price Index, taken from 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for major league teams and the U.K. Statistics 
Authority for EPL teams, and normalised to their level in the year 2000 (2000 = 100). 
The descriptive statistics for all these variables are presented in Table 4-3.  
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Table 4-3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Operationalization
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
overall 8,43 0,11 8,13 8,71 8,83 0,11 8,53 9,13 8,19 0,14 7,90 8,58 8,46 0,18 7,96 9,09 7,78 0,25 6,79 8,44
between 0,10 8,20 8,66 0,07 8,74 9,03 0,13 8,03 8,46 0,17 8,04 8,94 0,22 7,13 8,27
within 0,06 8,23 8,55 0,09 8,55 8,99 0,06 8,03 8,33 0,08 8,19 8,68 0,10 7,44 8,12
overall 7,71 0,11 7,32 8,66 7,89 0,08 7,63 8,09 7,54 0,13 7,07 7,87 7,80 0,18 7,12 8,27 7,59 0,23 7,05 8,20
between 0,07 7,57 7,90 0,02 7,86 7,93 0,09 7,38 7,73 0,16 7,49 8,19 0,20 7,16 7,96
within 0,09 7,46 8,54 0,08 7,64 8,08 0,09 7,23 7,79 0,09 7,42 8,05 0,13 7,18 8,20
overall 6,58 0,34 6,00 7,28 6,49 0,35 5,46 7,28 6,57 0,38 5,92 7,28 6,65 0,28 6,18 7,28 5,85 0,68 4,82 6,92
between 0,34 6,02 7,27 0,35 5,47 7,27 0,39 6,02 7,27 0,28 6,19 7,27 0,63 4,84 6,89
within 0,02 6,50 6,62 0,02 6,40 6,54 0,03 6,47 6,75 0,01 6,59 6,70 0,08 4,81 6,00
overall 4,23 0,06 4,05 4,35 4,83 0,06 4,56 4,95 4,22 0,06 4,04 4,35 4,46 0,14 3,90 4,72 4,51 0,15 4,18 4,88
between 0,05 4,14 4,32 0,05 4,69 4,93 0,05 4,12 4,32 0,14 3,99 4,68 0,14 4,20 4,85
within 0,02 4,05 4,30 0,03 4,70 4,96 0,03 4,09 4,39 0,07 4,24 4,64 0,04 4,26 4,64
overall 4,54 0,06 4,36 4,70 4,54 0,06 4,43 4,70 4,54 0,10 3,51 4,74 4,55 0,06 4,36 4,70 4,30 0,13 4,08 4,55
between 0,06 4,36 4,68 0,06 4,45 4,68 0,06 4,43 4,67 0,06 4,40 4,68 0,13 4,10 4,53
within 0,02 4,46 4,63 0,02 4,50 4,63 0,08 3,61 4,81 0,02 4,47 4,64 0,03 4,20 4,37
overall 50,18 14,49 15,85 81,71 50,05 19,27 0,00 100,00 1,00 0,17 0,45 1,37 50,04 7,23 26,54 71,60 1,07 0,28 0,66 1,84
between 9,61 26,80 70,73 9,88 27,78 70,84 0,11 0,78 1,28 4,78 41,63 59,28 0,24 0,66 1,60
within 11,48 17,66 80,80 16,65 6,29 88,94 0,13 0,53 1,32 5,49 31,11 70,07 0,12 0,75 1,42
overall 30,41 14,42 0,00 63,00 43,21 23,46 1,00 89,00 34,16 28,00 0,00 99,00 58,70 40,57 0,00 131,00 119 13,85 73,00 147,00
between 15,54 1,00 59,00 23,80 4,00 85,00 28,28 4,38 95,00 41,26 2,00 127,00 14,80 75,50 146,00
within 2,65 25,12 39,12 2,57 39,21 47,21 2,77 29,78 38,78 2,55 54,70 62,70 2,75 113,61 124,01
overall 13,86 10,51 1,00 47,00 17,91 15,02 1,00 79,00 14,28 10,84 2,00 49,00 24,47 25,13 1,00 98,00 80,28 47,12 1,00 151,00
between 10,02 5,00 43,50 12,82 5,00 49,00 10,46 6,00 45,00 23,64 5,00 94,00 46,40 5,67 151,00
within 3,25 5,64 32,64 8,11 -11,87 76,35 3,36 -2,23 28,65 8,42 -479703 47,14 14,06 31,10 167,08
NBA NFL NHL MLB Premier League
Tenure of team in the 
arena
Log Value 
(Revenue)
Log Pay
Log Population
Log Attendance
Log Income
Sporting 
Performance
Duration
Age Arena
Natural log of team 
payroll
Natural log of 
attendance
Duration of team in 
the league
Natural log of 
metropolitan area 
population
Natural log of 
metropolitan area 
income
Achieved 
WPG/Points in 
previous season
Natural log of team 
value in Dollar (GBP)
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4.4 Empirical Regression Model 
Because of the unbalanced panel traits of the data set, the empirical specification 
is: 
𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎1 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎5 𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝑎6 𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎7 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  , 
where 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of the value or revenue of team i in year t, 𝑎1 ⋯ 𝑛 
represent the coefficients of the explanatory variables that determine the value or 
revenue, βi (i = 1, …, n) is the unknown intercept for each entity, and εit is the error 
term. In this empirical analysis, each league undergoes a separate estimation, because 
each has different, league-specific regulations and policies. For example, MLB is 
exempt from antitrust laws; the extent of revenue sharing also strongly varies across 
leagues (Alexander & Kern, 2004). Because the data exhibit a panel structure, a 
Hausman test applies to each sub-sample; all data sets rely on fixed effects estimations, 
with the implication that unobserved team characteristics are present (Hausman, 1978).  
4.5 DEA Efficiency Model 
To evaluate the relative efficiency of the leagues under consideration with regard 
to their athletic and financial output, this study uses DEA, a linear programming 
technique introduced to measure the relative efficiency of decision-making units 
(DMUs), such as sport teams that transform inputs into outputs (Charnes, Cooper, & 
Rhodes, 1978; Banker, Charnes, & Cooper, 1984). Specifically, DEA compares the 
levels of inputs and outputs of one DMU with those of the rest of its peer group. The 
DMUs that produce the highest output with a given set of inputs define the efficient 
frontier, and the inefficiency of the other DMUs depends on their distance from this 
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efficient frontier. The weighting of inputs is defined by the algorithm and is therefore 
endogenous. Efficiency scores range between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates a perfectly 
efficient team. Mathematically, DEA resolves a linear programming formulation, 
assuming constant returns to scale (Farrell, 1957): 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝜆𝑖 
subject to 𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑧𝑖𝑌 
 𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖 ≥  𝑧𝑖𝑋 
       𝑧𝑖 ≥ 0 
where 𝜆𝑖 is the technical efficiency index reflecting an orientation to the input; 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖 
are the vectors that represent the quantities of m products produced by the organization 
and the quantities of k inputs, respectively; Y is the m  n DMU matrix; X is the k  n 
DMU matrix; and 𝑧𝑖 is a vector of constants. According to Dyson et al. (2001), the 
number of DMUs must be at least twice the product of the number of inputs  number 
of outputs.
14
 For this current data set, the fewest DMUs come from the EPL sample 
(20), which is greater than 2  1  7 = 14, so the ratio of DMUs to inputs/outputs is 
sufficient. Because DEA technique fails to include any statistical properties or account 
for measurement errors, Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) propose a bootstrap technique 
that estimates 95% confidence intervals for each DMU, such that they overcome this 
limitation and obtain bias-corrected results. Therefore, this study applies bootstrapped 
DEA with 2,000 replications.  
                                                 
14
 An alternative calculation method is: Number of DMUs = 3  (m + n), where “m” and “n” are the 
number of inputs and outputs respectively (El-Mahgary & Lahdelma, 1995; Despotis, 2002).  
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4.6 Econometric Findings 
4.6.1 Results of the Fixed-Effect Regression 
Table 4-4 displays the results of the fixed-effect regressions. As expected, the 
indicator for superior team quality (as measured by team payroll) affects the dependent 
variable positively, though the impact is not statistically significant for the NBA. The 
market size indicators, per capita income and population, generally indicate the 
expected positive sign but are not consistently statistically significant. Population is 
significantly positive for the NBA and significantly negative for the NFL; per capita 
income is significantly positive for NHL and MLB franchises and significantly negative 
for the NFL. In the EPL sample, both indicators reveal a positive but statistically 
insignificant result, perhaps because almost 60% of the team-season observations refer 
to three areas (London, Liverpool, and Manchester). The negative impact among NFL 
teams may stem from the league’s extensive revenue-sharing system, which minimises 
market size effects across teams (Alexander & Kern, 2004). Moreover, the market size 
effects for MLB in this study contradict the results obtained by Miller (2007).  
The proxy for game-day revenues indicates a positive impact on the dependent 
variable, and average attendance has a statistically significant impact in all samples. In 
addition, team history reveals the expected positive effect in all samples. Regarding 
facility age, the expected negative sign emerged in all samples but was significant only 
for MLB and NFL teams. For the EPL teams, this result might arise because the data set 
includes information on the overall age of the stadium but does not account for major 
renovations to existing stadiums due to data constraints. 
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To test the main hypothesis, namely, that sporting performance affects team 
values only among win-maximising teams, this study regresses the impact of sporting 
performance in the previous season on team values. In support of the predicted effects, 
sporting performance in the previous season was strongly statistically significant for the 
EPL teams but not significant for any North American major league. In the absence of 
revenue sharing (cf. national cup games) and with the qualification regulations for 
participating in European competitions (e.g., UEFA Champions League, UEFA Europa 
League), superior sporting performance is a requisite condition for EPL teams. 
Participating in one of the European competitions in turn sparks enormous increases in 
revenues. For example, gross commercial revenue from the UEFA Champions League 
for 2013-14 is estimated at €1.34 billion, which gets distributed among the participating 
teams, according to their level of success. Furthermore, the European system of 
promotion and relegation is based on win–loss records, and being promoted to the first 
division leads to higher revenues, due to better merchandise sales, higher ticket prices, 
and access to more broadcasting rights; being excluded from the first division implies 
less revenue. In contrast, a poor win–loss record in the North American major leagues 
actually prompts some rewards, in the form of higher draft picks for the next season. 
With regard to the explanatory power of the regressions, the R-square value for 
the NFL sample is considerably lower than those of the other samples, in line with 
Miller’s (2009) findings. It might reflect the primary driver of NFL revenues, that is, 
national television contracts. In the descriptive statistics, the betweenness variation for 
the dependent variable is lowest for the NFL, which implies that the variation in NFL 
franchise values is small—again likely an artefact of the league’s revenue-sharing 
agreement, which makes it harder to find team-specific determinants (Winfree, 2012).
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Table 4-4: Estimates of the fixed-effects regression 
 
 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Log Pay 0.0222 0.0311 0.0573* 0.0337 0.0911** 0.04 0.1704*** 0.0375 0.2254*** 0.0428
Log Population 1.0451*** 0.1751  -0.4353*** 0.1646 0.1345+ 0.1624  -0.3857+ 0.3122 0.0363+ 0.0437
Log Attendance 0.6745*** 0.0749 0.2951*** 0.0881 0.7052*** 0.1188 0.2211*** 0.0555 0.6509*** 0.1438
Log Income 0.1933+ 0.1551  -0.8484*** 0.16 0.1943*** 0.0462 1.2806*** 0.1995 0.1457+ 0.1858
SP (t-1) 0.0002+ 0.0002  -0.0001+ 0.0001 0.0268+ 0.0277 0.0001+ 0.0001 0.1188*** 0.0266
Duration 0.0086*** 0.0026 0.0363*** 0.0013 0.0051*** 0.0018 0.0162*** 0.0018 0.0162*** 0.0026
Age Arena -0.0008 0.0011  -0.0012*** 0.0002 -0.0016 0.0012  -0.005* 0.0003  -0.0001+ 0.0004
Constant  -2.6077** 1.3344 12.085*** 1.3828 2.5757* 1.0851 1.9090+ 2.2343  -0.9567+ 1.2735
Number of obs.
R-squared within:
R-squared between:
R-squared overall:
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho
Probability
***, ** and * denote statistical signif icance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignif icance; SP = Sporting performance; SE = standard errors.
263 285 237 269 183
NBA NFL NHL MLB EPL
0.4169 0.0077 0.7004 0.1065 0.263
0.6098 0.876 0.4459 0.7047 0.8197
0.3986 0.8544 0.1061 0.6517 0.3016
0.3121 0.0226 0.636 0.0982 0.2792
0.9887 0.9983 0.8154 0.9947 0.976
0.0424 0.035 0.0505 0.0474 0.0472
0 0 0 0 0
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 In summary, the differences in the determinants that influence team values and 
revenues between North American major leagues and the English Premier League is 
apparent only through a close consideration of sporting performance. To explicate the 
results from the regression analysis in more detail, the next section focuses on athletic 
and financial efficiency results as well. 
4.6.2 DEA Efficiency Results 
On the basis of an efficiency analysis with an assumption of constant returns to 
scale, Table 4-5 provides the bootstrapped global technical efficiency scores for 
sporting technical efficiency, for which winning percentage or relative points obtained 
in season t is the output. Table 4-6 then presents the global technical efficiency scores 
for financial efficiency, where franchise values or revenues for EPL are the output. The 
input factors are identical to the explanatory variables applied in the regression analysis. 
The separate analyses for each league reflect each team’s annual efficiency scores for 
2001-2009, using a comparison of each team with its peers on an annual basis.  
Table 4-5: Global technical efficiency scores for sporting efficiency 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
EPL 0.905 0.928 0.950 0.879 0.806 0.915 0.892 0.919 0.972 0.907 
NBA 0.840 0.828 0.805 0.767 0.813 0.856 0.824 0.744 0.791 0.807 
NFL 0.718 0.809 0.735 0.739 0.703 0.763 0.685 0.710 0.697 0.729 
NHL 0.886 0.914 0.887 0.922 - 0.855 0.875 0.941 0.940 0.902 
MLB 0.934 0.928 0.911 0.933 0.926 0.939 0.905 0.869 0.942 0.921 
In the test to determine if the overall sporting efficiency in the EPL exceeds that 
of the major league franchises—which would affirm that the EPL is more win-oriented 
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than its North American counterparts—the EPL actually ranked second, with a mean 
efficiency of 0.907, whereas the mean efficiency of MLB was 0.921. In general, these 
results indicated that the two leagues achieved 90.7% and 92.1% of their potential, 
respectively. The mean efficiency scores across the other major league franchises varied 
considerably, such that NFL franchises exhibited an efficiency score of just 0.729, and 
the NBA franchises reached 0.807. Applying a t-test proves that the difference of means 
between the leagues is statistically significant different from 0.
15
 The likely explanation 
for the considerably lower score for the NFL again derives from the revenue-sharing 
regulations. Regardless of their level of success on the field, NFL franchises receive a 
fixed percentage of the league’s overall revenues, such as those earned through 
broadcasting contracts. Therefore, NFL franchises do not depend as much on local 
income, such as game-day revenues, as the other major leagues do. 
This argument also received support from the results for financial efficiency in 
Table 6, because the revenue-maximising major league franchises performed closer to 
the efficiency frontier than the win-maximising EPL clubs. That is, all the North 
American major leagues reported higher overall mean efficiency scores than those 
obtained by the EPL. The NBA and NFL franchises were the top ranked, with overall 
mean efficiency values of 0.919 and 0.909, respectively, followed by MLB (0.897) and 
NHL (0.886) franchises. The EPL’s overall mean efficiency score of 0.878 ranked last. 
In a comparison with the results for sporting efficiency, if the NBA and NFL are 
excluded as outliers, all leagues operated in similar proximity to the economic frontier, 
                                                 
15
 The p-Value of 0.000 denotes rejecting the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is 
zero. 
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such that the difference between the first ranked NBA and last ranked EPL was 
relatively small.  
Table 4-6: Global technical efficiency scores for financial efficiency 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
EPL 0.882 0.848 0.841 0.919 0.901 0.828 0.909 0.885 0.890 0.878 
NBA 0.937 0.946 0.905 0.926 0.875 0.911 0.911 0.922 0.938 0.919 
NFL 0.812 0.869 0.929 0.934 0.915 0.925 0.955 0.922 0.922 0.909 
NHL 0.901 0.867 0.877 0.902 - 0.898 0.886 0.871 0.882 0.886 
MLB 0.884 0.882 0.882 0.891 0.899 0.899 0.922 0.932 0.878 0.897 
Finally, the analysis of the margin of efficiency scores, as summarised in Table 4-
7, confirmed the hypothesis that the major league franchises tend to be business driven. 
Margin of efficiency scores reflect the difference between sporting and financial 
technical efficiency. In this analysis, a greater positive value indicated the 
predominance of a sporting focus, whereas an increasing negative value suggested a 
business-oriented organization. If the margin between sporting and financial efficiency 
was smaller, the two factors appeared more balanced.  
Table 4-7: Global technical efficiency margin scores of sporting and financial efficiency 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
EPL 0.023 0.079 0.109 -0.040 -0.095 0.087 -0.017 0.034 0.082 0.029 
NBA -0.097 -0.118 -0.099 -0.159 -0.063 -0.055 -0.087 -0.178 -0.147 -0.112 
NFL -0.095 -0.059 -0.194 -0.195 -0.212 -0.162 -0.269 -0.213 -0.226 -0.181 
NHL -0.015 0.047 0.009 0.020 - -0.043 -0.010 0.069 0.058 0.017 
MLB 0.051 0.046 0.029 0.042 0.026 0.040 -0.017 -0.064 0.064 0.024 
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In this comparison, the EPL emerged with the highest positive value across all 
leagues, in support of the sporting rationale. The calculations for MLB and NHL also 
show positive values; the NFL and NBA revealed negative values. Thus, the results 
aligned with the prediction that North American major league franchises would be more 
focused on business, while EPL clubs pursue success on the field. 
4.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In investigating the determinants of major league and English Premier League 
franchise values and revenues, this study shows that the impact of athletic achievement 
on financial performance is significant only for EPL clubs, not for teams in North 
American major leagues. The analyses of the different leagues’ sporting and financial 
efficiency support the sporting hypothesis, which holds that EPL clubs value sporting 
performance over financial performance, in contrast with the major league franchises. 
This outcome might also reflect the differences in the league systems; for example, in 
European soccer leagues, an improved league position directly increases revenues, by 
granting those teams the right to participate in European competitions. In the major 
leagues, revenue sharing and drafting rights instead ensure consistent revenues and 
benefits, even for franchises with an inferior sporting performance.  
Due to data constraints the applied sample is composed by four U.S. leagues and 
solely one European league and might be unbalanced in geographic representativity. In 
addition, all leagues belong to different sports and consequently the observed 
differences might not be explained only by a difference in pursued objectives.  
Accordingly, further studies should investigate whether other European leagues 
(e.g., Spanish Primera Division, German Bundesliga) exhibit similar efficiency levels in 
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their sporting and financial performance. Additional research also could draw 
comparisons with other leagues, to examine the extent to which sporting performance 
influences team values and revenues. However, such investigations could be hindered 
by the lack of publicly available data.  
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5 Does Performance Consistency Pay-Off Financially for Players? 
Evidence from the Bundesliga 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In recent years professional team sports steadily gained popularity around the 
globe entailing an expanding industry with large revenues and increasing employment. 
Coincidental professional team sports drew the attention of academics as numerous 
economic studies have been published in the field of sports economics ever since. A 
particularly popular strand of literature analyses the remuneration of professional 
athletes to explain observable wage dispersions in professional sports. Previous studies 
in the field frequently relied on the Mincerian income equation (1974) to analyze the 
impact of manifold drivers of salary. Several individual characteristics including age, 
experience, talent, position, team effects, country of origin and especially average 
performance have been found to define player salaries. By contrast, research concerning 
consistency of performance is still in the beginning. This is to some extent surprising as 
supposedly owners and managers would favor high consistency in performance by their 
employees in order to reduce monitoring costs as well as the uncertainty of output 
generation. Maybe surprisingly our estimations reveal that while average performance 
influences salary in a significant positive way, consistency of performance reduces 
players’ remuneration. 
The current research is innovative by closing this gap in the literature and 
providing a novel approach as we analyze game level data from the German Bundesliga 
soccer for five consecutive seasons between 2005-06 and 2009-10. The data set contains 
information for 845 different players and totals in 34,413 game-level performance 
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observations. To measure performance consistency, the variation coefficient over each 
season is calculated for player evaluations compiled by experts and published in 
“Kicker Sportmagazin”, a highly respected soccer magazine. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical approach to determine if consistency in player 
performance is rewarded monetarily in professional soccer. Further, our research 
disentangles the influence of consistency for different parts of the salary distribution 
providing information if consistency of performance by “star-players” have a different 
impact on salary compared to average players. Our analysis suggests that the negative 
impact of consistency on salary is observable for different parts of the salary 
distribution. Finally, we present suggestions for these unreckoned findings to identify 
avenues for further research in this understudied field highlighting the importance of 
sport specific impact by its given rules and regulations. 
The chapter is organized as follows: The next section provides a review of the 
existing literature on salary determination in professional soccer followed by a brief 
discussion of the results. Section 3 introduces the applied data, specifies our model and 
presents the results of the empirical analysis. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the empirical results and limitations to present an outlook on future research. 
5.2 Literature Review 
Fertilized by available and detailed information on player salaries, performance 
statistics and individual characteristics a large number of studies have already been 
published on the drivers of remuneration in professional soccer. When it comes to 
performance related information studies uniformly rely on average performance (mostly 
from the previous season) neglecting if players perform consistently or volatile. 
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Concerning professional soccer Bryson, Frick & Simmons (2013) find empirical 
evidence of a salary premium for two-footedness as well as a statistically significant 
impact of players’ age, number of international appearances and position on the pitch. 
Similar results for age and experience are repeatedly reported in the literature 
(Lehmann, 2000; Huebl & Swieter, 2002; Lucifora & Simmons, 2003; Garcia-del-
Barrio & Puyol, 2007; Wicker et al., 2013). Continuously determined is a reversed U-
shaped relationship between age and salary as physical performance erodes over time. 
In addition, salaries reportedly rise with experience, as in number of league games 
(Lehmann & Weigand, 1999; Huebl & Swieter, 2002; Frick, 2007) as well as 
international appearances for the national team or appearances in European and World 
Cups (Lucifora & Simmons, 2003; Franck & Nüesch, 2008; Lehmann & Schulze, 2008) 
entail higher salaries, again supporting diminishing returns. 
Previous research also accounts for the position on the field and its impact on 
salary. Studies predominantly report that more offensive positions are paid a wage 
premium (Huebl & Swieter, 2002; Lucifora & Simmons, 2003; Frick, 2006). Due to 
their high specialization and low flexibility to take other positions on the field 
goalkeepers on average earn the least while forwards receive the highest salaries 
(Lehmann, 2000). 
Studies focusing on the major North American sport leagues (NBA, NFL, MLB, 
NHL and MLS) also found a significant impact of experience, performance and peer 
reputation on players´ salary (Kahn, 1993; Hamilton, 1997; Quirk & Fort, 1999; Idson 
& Kahane, 2000; Zimbalist, 2002; Berri & Simmons, 2009; Lee & Harris, 2012). 
Perhaps surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge only one empirical work is 
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concerned with players’ consistency to explain salary. Bodvarsson & Brastow (1998) 
analyze players from the National Basketball Association. They follow the argument 
that for a given average performance coaches as well as general managers prefer 
consistent over volatile performance. Compared to their study our work offers several 
important contributions. First, in contrast to Bodvarsson & Brastow (1998) our data 
offers information over several seasons, allowing for a longitudinal analysis controlling 
for unobservable factors. Given the large number of observations we are furthermore 
able to control for team, season and position effects. In addition, we extend 
understanding of how consistency of performance is rewarded or punished for different 
parts of the salary distribution by applying quantile regressions. Further, we are able to 
rely on a single performance measure accounting for overall performance which is 
unavailable in other sports. An overview of previous literature and the empirical 
findings is provided in Table 5-1. 
Summarizing, it appears that salaries in professional soccer are not just random, 
but that systematic factors determine salaries to a large extent and that these systematic 
factors (e.g. age, experience and performance) are very similar to those found for other 
occupations (Bryson, Frick & Simmons, 2013). However, the variation in salaries in 
professional sports that can be explained by a small set of variables is quite large 
compared to studies analyzing representative labor market surveys. What previous 
studies have in common is a recurrent measurement of average performance to 
determine its impact on salary (see Table 5-1). As not all participants in sports are 
identical in terms of performance consistency, our research expands existing work as we 
account for volatility in performance. The relation to labor markets is straightforward. 
While some individuals are able to perform at a very consistent rate others do not. The 
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question arises how managers value consistency by determining the financial surplus to 
the athlete. One argument in favor of a salary premium for consistent performance 
follows the rationale of monitoring costs. Monitoring costs are presumably lower for 
workers displaying a constant productivity compared to those whose performance is 
rather volatile. For a given average performance monitoring costs decrease as 
consistency increases which leads to the assumption that salary offers are higher for 
those employees who are performing more consistently.
16
 For professional soccer the 
implication might not be that straightforward, since the composition of workforces 
differs dramatically from those of companies competing in traditional markets. Firstly, 
performance can be observed easily and hence at lower costs. This would suggest less 
difference in salaries due to variance in performance. Secondly, coaches can simply 
substitute players displaying a bad performance in the production process. This might 
even result in a preference towards inconsistent players as performance outliers reach 
higher levels for inconsistent players who can be substituted or simply disregarded in 
the initial line-up. A possible result of this could be a wage premium for inconsistent 
players. 
Given these arguments the relation between performance consistency and salary 
remains unclear from a theoretical standpoint. As game-by-game performance is 
observable for soccer we are able to estimate how consistency affects remuneration for 
the specific labor market the German Bundesliga. 
                                                 
16
 See Bodvarsson & Brastow (1998). 
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Table 5-1: Literature on salary determination for professional soccer 
Author(s) Data Applied Model  Empirical Findings 
Wicker et al. (2013) Sample of 877 players from the 
2011-12 and 2012-13 season of 
the German Bundesliga 
Fixed- and random effects 
regression with natural 
logarithm of market value 
The results indicate that effort 
approximated by running distance and 
average number of intensive runs has 
no significant positive impact Games 
played, age as well as scoring 
performance show a positive impact on 
market values 
Bryson, Frick & Simmons (2013) Data 1: 1,991 European league 
players of the 2005-06 season  
Data 2: Bundesliga panel with 
1,314 player-season observations 
over 2002-03 to 2006-07 
OLS and quantile regressions 
with natural logarithm of 
annual salary 
The authors find empirical evidence 
that the ability of two-footedness is 
rewarded monetarily. Further, variables 
such as age, height, goals per game in 
the last season as well as international 
appearances generate an increment in 
salary 
Frank & Nüesch (2008) Sample of 429 players from 
2004-05 German Bundesliga 
season 
OLS and quantile regression 
with natural logarithm of 
market value 
Empirical findings indicate that market 
values are better predicted by expert 
evaluations. Goals and assists have no 
significant impact whereas player´s 
popularity influence market values 
Garcia-del-Barrio & Puyol (2007) Sample of 369 players appearing 
in the Spanish Primera Division 
in 2001-02 
OLS regression with natural 
logarithm of market value 
The results display that commercial 
attractiveness (measured by Google 
hits), sporting performance (measured 
by external ratings) and international 
experience of players are rewarded 
monetarily 
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Table 5-1: Literature on salary determination for professional soccer (continued) 
Author(s) Data Applied Model  Empirical Findings 
Lucifora & Simmons (2003) 1995-96 single season data 
including 730 outfield players 
from the Italian Serie A & B 
OLS regression with natural 
logarithm of gross salary 
The results reveal the presence of a 
superstar effect on salary as well as 
significant impacts of experience, 
performance and reputation on salary 
Huebl & Swieter (2002) Panel data set for the seasons 
1994-95 to 1999-2000 containing 
574 player appearances in the 
German Bundesliga 
OLS and random-effects with 
natural logarithm of annual 
salary 
The authors find a reversed U-shaped 
relationship between age, career games 
and salary. In addition, the authors find 
an impact of contract duration, team 
change, sponsoring revenues as well as 
qualification for European cups on 
salary 
Lehmann (2000) 1999-2000 single season data 
including 463 player 
observations from German 
Bundesliga 
OLS regression with natural 
logarithm of annual salary 
Positive influence of games played last 
season, country of origin, tackles, 
assists and sponsoring revenues on 
salary. In contrast, substitutions are 
reported to have a negative impact 
Lehmann & Weigand (1999) 1998-99 single season data 
including 468 player 
observations from German 
Bundesliga 
OLS regression with natural 
logarithm of annual salary 
The authors find evidence that career 
games, country of origin, attendance, 
sponsoring revenues and qualification 
for European cups impact salaries 
    
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Does Performance Consistency Pay-Off Financially for Players? Evidence 
from the Bundesliga                
 
 62 
5.3 Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
The data set we analyze in this paper contains season statistics for all players who 
appeared in the German Bundesliga anytime between the 2005-06 and the 2009-10 
season. In addition to average statistics we gathered game-by-game performance 
measures for each game a player appeared in and had been rated by external experts. 
Our data set contains 845 different players and yields in 34,413 player-match day-
observations. The Bundesliga continuously consisted of 18 teams with 34 match days in 
each of the five analyzed seasons and therefore the data set includes player statistics 
from a total of 3,060 season games. In contrast to the closed-shop major leagues in the 
U.S. most European leagues apply a relegation and promotion system. Each season the 
three worst performing teams in the German Bundesliga are replaced by the top three 
teams from the second division (2nd Bundesliga) resulting in a varying composition of 
the league over the analyzed period. During the five seasons 26 different clubs played in 
the Bundesliga due to annual promotion and relegation. 
The primary data source for this study is the highly respected German sports 
journal “Kicker Sportmagazin” that publishes salary estimations prior to the start of 
each season as a reliable proxy for the otherwise undisclosed salary. Based on previous 
publications we approximate salaries for season t as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 (𝑡) =  
𝑘𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑡)
1.5
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The reliability of this salary information has been documented repeatedly: 
Torgler and Schmidt (2007) confirmed robustness by comparing salary information by 
Kicker with the market value evaluations by www.transfermarkt.de, another reliable 
data source. The correlation between the two data sources is reported to be as high as 
0.75. Furthermore, Frick (2006) correlates the salary information by Kicker with a 
subset of actual salary data for 2 seasons from the Bundesliga finding the correlation to 
be high as 0.8. Further studies using the salary estimations by “Kicker” include 
Eschweiler & Vieth (2004), Hübl & Swieter (2002), Lehmann & Weigand (1999), as 
well as Lehmann & Schulze (2005). Our study follows this literature and uses this proxy 
to analyze the impact of performance consistency on player salaries. 
Moreover, Kicker weekly publishes a subjective individual performance 
evaluation following each Bundesliga match. It accounts for overall performance 
throughout the match as the output of professional players is highly complex and can 
hardly be defined by only one objective measure such as number of tackles, goals 
scored or assists. This is especially useful because of the varying job descriptions 
(goalkeeper, defender, midfielder, forward) as each position is assigned with a different 
duty (see Lehmann & Weigand, 1999; Lucifora & Simmons, 2003; Frank & Nüesch, 
2010). Trusting evaluations by experts is common practice in the sport economics 
literature (Littkemann & Kleist, 2002; Garcia-del-Barrio & Pujol, 2005; Bryson, Frick 
& Simmons, 2013). Performance evaluation is comparable to performance measuring in 
the German school system and itemizes grades from 1.0 (excellent) to 6.0 (very poor). 
To receive grading after a match a player has to be on the pitch for a minimum of 30 
minutes. 
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Our analyses accounts for the average grade (GRD) over a season as we set the 
minimum number of appearances during a season to five. 
The main contribution of this paper is to shed light on the impact of consistency 
of performance on salaries of professional soccer players in Germany. We define 
consistency as the deviation of performance around average performance for a given 
player and season. Consequently we analyze to what extent variations in player 
performance explain variations in player remuneration. As variance increases with the 
mean we compute the variation coefficient (VAR) of performance over a season as 
follows: 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑡) =  
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑡)
∅ 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 (𝑡)
 
Admittedly one could argue that for a given variance in performance, a higher 
(worse) average grade reduces the coefficient of variation. To lessen this concern, all 
results to follow still hold as we conduct the estimations substituting the variation 
coefficient of performance by the variance of performance to display performance 
consistency. 
Apart from (average) performance and its consistency other factors possibly 
determining players’ salaries have to be accounted for. Previous job experience is 
expected to have a positive impact on remuneration according to human capital theory. 
Our measures for age (AGE), games played in the Bundesliga (BLG) and number of 
appearances on national squads (NAT) (all measured prior to the respective season) 
display players’ experience. We expect a positive impact of experience on salary 
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accompanied with decreasing marginal returns (negative impact of AGE2, BLG2 and 
NAT2), equivalent to an upward-sloping experience-earnings profile. To account for 
any positional or team bias in ratings we include team as well as season dummies. Team 
effects are supposed to have a significant influence on player salaries as some teams 
were found to pay their players a premium salary (Idson & Kahane, 2000; Frick, 2008). 
A summary of all variables included is presented in Table 5-2 while summary statistics 
are provided in Table 5-3. 
Table 5-2: Overview of variables 
Variable Operationalization 
lnPAY natural logarithm salary 
VAR (t-1) Variation coefficient of performance evaluation (T-1) 
GRD (t-1) performance evaluation (T-1) 
AGE Age (at beginning of season) 
AGE2 squared age (at beginning of season) 
NAT (career) appearances national team (at beginning of season) 
NAT2 (career) squared appearances national team (at beginning of season) 
BLG (career) Bundesliga career games (at beginning of season) 
BLG2 (career) squared Bundesliga career games (at beginning of season) 
GK Goalkeeper (Dummy; 1=yes) Reference 
DEF Defender (Dummy; 1=yes) 
MID Midfielder (Dummy; 1=yes) 
FOR Forward (Dummy; 1=yes) 
Team Dummies Dummy-variable for players´ team 
Season Dummies Dummy-variable for analyzed season 
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Table 5-3: Summary of descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnPAY 845 13.97 0.72 11.11 16.11 
VAR (t-1) 845 0.21 0.11 0 0.88 
GRD (t-1) 845 3.62 0.39 2.38 5.1 
AGE 845 25.86 4.04 16 41 
AGE2 845 685.54 215.43 256 1.681 
NAT (career) 845 13.28 20.61 0 138 
NAT2 (career) 845 600.81 1520.09 0 19.044 
BLG (career) 845 65.71 76.45 0 531 
BLG2 (career) 845 10.158,9 22.090,97 0 281.961 
GK 845 0.08  0 1 
DEF 845 0.33  0 1 
MID 845 0.38  0 1 
FOR 845 0.2  0 1 
Team Dummies       0 1 
Season Dummies       0 1 
 
During the observed time period the average salaries rose by approximately 39% 
from 1,185,014€ in 2005-06 to 1,642,796 € in 2009-10. A similar trend can also be 
observed over the different positions on the field. On average the more offensive 
positions on the field receive higher salaries. Since we required a minimum of five 
appearances for a given season to be included in the estimation, the number of 
Goalkeepers (135) in the data set is comparably low as the position is only occupied 
once and substitution of goalkeepers is very rare. Therefore, the less earning substitute 
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goalkeepers are seldom included in the sample. Waiving our minimum number of 
appearances the average salary of goalkeepers would drop below the average salary of 
defenders. 
Concerning average performance Figure 5-1 suggests that goalkeepers receive 
the lowest (best) whereas forwards receive the highest (worst) ratings. Defenders and 
midfielders receive almost identical average ratings. Interestingly, out of all players who 
were graded with 1.0 (excellent) for a single game forwards accounted for 55%. In 
contrast, goalkeepers only accounted for 15% of the top grades but also account for 9% 
of all player appearances. 
 
Figure 5-1: Average expert ratings by position 
The variation coefficient for performance by position is documented in Figure 5-
2. Comparable to the variable average performance, our key variable displaying 
consistency, influences players’ salaries also shows positional differences. In particular 
for the offensive forwards and midfielders we observe a higher variation coefficient 
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compared to defenders and goalkeepers. Especially forwards exhibit above average 
values in each season considered. This finding is supported by a t-test.
17
 
 
Figure 5-2: Variation coefficient of performance by players´ position 
Additionally, the variation coefficient increased considerably for each position 
between 2005-06 and 2009-10. For forwards it increased by 17%, for defenders by 
16%, midfielders reported an increase of 14% and goalkeepers slightly increased by 7% 
with a decreasing value over the last two seasons analyzed. 
5.4 Econometric Findings 
Our analysis uses the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) earnings function. As 
this estimation technique works best under the assumption of normal error distribution it 
is very sensitive towards outliers. As salary is clearly non-normally distributed quantile 
regressions (.10, .25, .50, .75, .90 quantile) with bootstrapped standard errors (100 
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repetitions) are applied to estimate varying marginal effects of the independent variables 
at different parts of the salary distribution. 
A possible endogeneity problem between performance and salary was met by the 
introduction of a time lag of one season. While salary information is obtained from 
season t, the independent variables concerning performance are drawn from the 
respective previous season t-1. 
The empirical specification adopted is 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑎2 𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝑎3 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝑎4 𝐴𝐺𝐸²𝑡 + 𝑎5 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑡−1  
+ 𝑎6 𝑁𝐴𝑇²𝑡−1 + 𝑎7 𝐵𝐿𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎8 𝐵𝐿𝐺²𝑡 + 𝑎9 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑡 + 𝑎10 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡−1
+ 𝑎11 𝑇𝐸𝐴𝑀𝑡 + 𝑎12 𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑂𝑁𝑡 +  𝜀 
 
Where lnPAYt represents the natural log of the salary, 𝑎0is a constant, 𝑎1 to 𝑎12  are 
vectors of parameters to be estimated and ɛ is an error term. Given the panel structure of 
the data the Hausman test suggests to rely on the fixed-effects estimation implying that 
unobserved player characteristics are present.
18
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Results from Hausman test (Hausman, 1978): 
 
= 98.61, p < .05. 
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Estimation for OLS- and fixed-effects regressions are presented in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4: Estimation results for OLS and fixed-effects regressions 
lnPay OLS robust   Fixed-Effects 
VAR (t-1) 0.9231*** 
 
0.4269*** 
GRD (t-1) -0.7216*** 
 
-0.4863*** 
AGE 0.0881** 
 
-0.2276+ 
AGE2 -0.0022*** 
 
-0.0038* 
NAT (career) 0.0055*** 
 
-0.0018+ 
NAT2 (career) -0.0001+ 
 
-0.0001+ 
BLG (career) 0.0017*** 
 
0.0133*** 
BLG2 (career) -0.0009** 
 
-0.0001*** 
DEF 0.1585** 
 
0.0024+ 
MID 0.1975*** 
 
0.0529+ 
FOR 0.3652*** 
 
0.2168** 
CONS 15.66*** 
 
18.36*** 
Team Dummies included 
Season Dummies included 
N of Obs. 845   845 
N of Players 432    -- 
R2*100 58.01   42.12 
F-Value 31.90***   8.64*** 
sigma_u  --   0.7471 
sigma_e  --   0.2408 
rho  --   0.9058 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance. 
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As expected the estimations go in line with human capital theory with the age-
salary profile being upward sloping and concave. Analogue experience as in career 
Bundesliga games (BLG) and appearances for the national team (NAT) proves to 
increase salaries at a decreasing rate. 
Outfield players receive a significantly higher salary compared to the reference 
position goalkeeper. For outfield players the more offensive a position is, the higher is 
the salary premium for the position. Remembering the descriptive statistics we can 
conclude that the more offensive a position the poorer the average ratings but at the 
same time the most offensive position on the field forwards receive the highest salary 
premium. 
The assumption that average performance influences salaries can be confirmed. 
In both estimations the coefficient is statistically significant with a negative sign. Since 
the lowest rating (1.0) equals the best possible performance by a player a negative sign 
was expected. The relative weight of the variable in the OLS model shows that a one 
standard deviation improvement in rating increased the salary of a player by 72%, 
respectively 47% in the fixed-effects estimation. 
To test the main hypothesis which claims that performance consistency is 
rewarded monetarily, we analyze the impact of the variation coefficient of performance 
on player salaries. Both estimations reject our assumption that consistency is rewarded 
monetarily. Quite the contrary can be observed as the coefficient of VAR is highly 
significant in both regressions, but instead of the expected negative sign the influence is 
positive. Interestingly, a one standard deviation increase in our measure of 
inconsistency is rewarded with a surplus of 92% in the OLS and a 48% increase in 
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player salaries in the fixed-effects model. For a given average performance managers 
and team owners seem to prefer unpredictable players that on a good day might make 
the difference in order to win a match. 
In the 2009-10 season the 25% highest paid players accounted for 46% of the 
total sum of salaries paid. This skewed income distribution can be explained with 
Rosen´s theory of superstars where small differences in talent translate into large 
differences in pay (Rosen, 1981, 1983), supported by Figure 3. Applying the 
D´Agostino test (D´Agostino, Belanger & D´Agostino Jr., 1990) we get further approve 
that salaries significantly differ from a normal distribution.
19
 
 
Figure 5-3: Kernel Density Estimates of player salaries 
                                                 
19
 The p-value of 0.000 suggests rejecting of the null hypothesis that kurtosis does not depart from a 
normal distribution. 
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Given this skewed distribution previous studies called for quantile regressions, 
originally developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), (see Hamilton, 1997; Franck & 
Nüesch, 2008; Lehmann & Schulze, 2008; Berri & Simmons, 2009; Simmons & Berri, 
2009; Vincent & Eastman, 2009; Kahane, 2010 for sports economics applications). The 
particular advantage of quantile regression is to measure the impact of performance and 
characteristics for different parts of the salary distribution (Koenker, 2005). In order to 
ensure robustness of standard errors, we apply bootstrapping with 100 replications. The 
results of the quantile regressions are reported in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5: Impact of consistent performance on salary (Quantile Regressions) 
lnPay 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
VAR (t-1) 1.1094** 1.2123*** 1.0068*** 0.9535*** 1.0349*** 
GRD (t-1) -0.7522*** -0.7691*** -0.7579*** -0.7041*** -0.6292*** 
AGE 0.1476** 0.1531** 0.1191** -0.0001+ 0.0465+ 
AGE2 -0.0034** -0.0035** -0.0028** -0.0003+ -0.0011+ 
NAT (career) 0.0052* 0.0061** 0.0054** 0.0038+ 0.0042** 
NAT2 (career) -0.0001+ -0.0001* -0.0197+ -0.0081+ -0.0001+ 
BLG (career) 0.0041*** 0.0028** 0.0021*** 0.0016** 0.0012** 
BLG2 (career) -0.0001*** -0.0141+ -0.0118** -0.0091** -0.0098*** 
DEF 0.2710** 0.2711** 0.2163** 0.1258+ 0.0735+ 
MID 0.2203** 0.3091** 0.2881*** 0.1699** 0.1527** 
FOR 0.4342*** 0.4348*** 0.4348*** 0.3175*** 0.2211*** 
CONS 14.69*** 14.76*** 17.64*** 16.84*** 17.99*** 
Team Dummies included 
Season Dummies included 
N of Obs. 845 
Pseudo R2*100 31.64 34.62 39.29 42.12 44.45 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance. 
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The estimations retrieved from the quantile regression in general support the 
results obtained from the OLS and fixed-effects regression revealing further interesting 
insights. The results demonstrate that AGE only seems to influence salary for the lower 
paid players at the .10, .25 and .50 quantile whereas BLG remains significant for all 
quantiles with a constant decreasing influence as salaries increase. Also international 
experience (NAT) remains significant for all quantiles with a decreasing impact as 
salaries rise. The position a player contains also loses importance as the bonus for the 
offensive positions MID and FOR diminishes. 
Paying attention to the main variables we observe that both performance 
measures are statistically significant throughout all quantiles. In addition, the average 
performance displays a surplus of up to 76% for the .25 and .50 quantile. 
Regarding performance consistency the quantile regressions even strengthen the 
results from the OLS and fixed-effects regression. Therefore, inconsistency or the 
characteristic of a player to be unpredictable is rewarded monetarily. The salary 
premium is reported for all quantiles in the sample. 
5.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Since little is known about the impact of consistency on player remuneration in 
professional sports this paper presents insights for professional soccer in Germany. We 
find strong evidence for a salary premium for players who perform inconsistently. 
These results contradict the findings by Bodvarsson & Brastow (1998) who were the 
first to empirically analyze the relationship between pay and consistency in 
performance. Instead of rewarding consistency general managers seem to reward 
inconsistency in performance monetarily. A possible explanation for the contrary results 
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might be found in the data. The data richness in this study as well as the panel 
characteristic of the data set offer the possibility of advanced empirical analyses 
improving the efficiency of econometric estimates. 
In addition, the rules of the game might also help to explain this result: A single 
goal scored or a pass that leads to a goal and even one defensive stop often make the 
difference for the outcome of a game. This is to be valued even more since soccer 
increased the number of points being rewarded for a win from two to three. The applied 
non-zero sum reward scheme in soccer with a 3-1-0 system (3 points for a win,1 point 
for a tie and 0 points for a loss) consequently leads to a more offensive and therefore 
more riskier style of play with fewer ties and more wins (see Baslevent & Tunali, 2001; 
Haugen, 2008; Dilger & Geyer, 2009 and Moschini, 2010).  
In the adopted reward scheme the gain from a win is disproportionately higher 
than from a tie, illustrated in Figure 5-4 (Grund & Gürtler, 2005). As a result it is 
generally advantageous to follow a riskier strategy by adding more inconsistent players. 
More precisely this seems to apply especially for offensive players as suggested by the 
analyzed data. In terms of influencing the outcome of a game a forward might not score 
from several chances but simultaneously will not affect the score. In contrast, a missed 
tackle by a defender or goalkeeper might directly influence the score and the outcome of 
the game. 
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Figure 5-4: Reward scheme Bundesliga 
Hence players with varying performance might be preferred as they are able to 
make the difference with a higher probability. Additionally, Longley (2005) points out 
that the risk of the employer decreases as the number of employees increases, powering 
the idea that a below average performance by one employee can be offset rather easily 
by another employee. As soccer sees a rotation in the line-up on a very regular basis this 
might additionally drive the results as coaches are able to replace underperforming 
players by players of adequate skill. 
As studies on consistency of performance are very rare manifold research strings 
seem to be promising: In order to serve as robustness checks, a cross-sport evaluation 
seems promising. Collecting panel data, e.g. from professional basketball, football and 
ice-hockey would serve as comparison to check if inconsistent player evaluations 
improve salaries and if there are sports related differences in results. 
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6 Environmental Regulations and the Relocation of Production: A 
Panel Analysis of German Industry Investment Behaviour  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has risen dramatically in recent years. In 2006, 
global FDI flows amounted to $1305.9 billion compared to $832.6 billion in 2001. This 
represents an average growth rate of 7.79% per year. Developing economies report an 
average growth rate of 10.17% per year and therefore are a major factor in this trend. 
Contrary to the developing countries, developed economies only report an average 
growth rate of 5.87% per year (UNCTAD, 2007). Simultaneously, with increasing FDI 
flows environmentalists and ecologically-orientated academics argue that multinational 
enterprises (MNE) engaged in highly polluting activities move to developing countries, 
where the costs of complying with environmental standards are significantly lower. 
The aim of this article is to provide new empirical evidence to the debate of the 
pollution haven hypothesis and the existence of a pollution haven effect. The paper will 
analyze Total German outbound FDI as well as German outbound FDI on selected 
industries in the manufacturing sector and provide several novelties that have not been 
applied in previous studies. Firstly, the article solely employs data from Germany rather 
than data from the U.S., which was primarily used in previous studies. In addition, the 
determinants of FDI are customized and specifically tailored to German outbound FDI 
using the theoretical approach on FDI by Dunning (1988) combined with empirical 
evidence from German surveys conducted by several leading institutions. In order to 
control for unobserved country heterogeneity in the empirical analysis the study applies 
a panel data set to analyse German FDI flows from 2000 to 2006. To test whether there 
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is a statistically significant relationship between German FDI and environmental 
regulations, the study employs an environmental ranking published by the World 
Economic Forum for each year of the sample period. This new approach makes it 
possible to combine German outbound FDI flows with a reliable measured variable on 
environmental regulations for almost every country that received German FDI.  
6.2 Literature Review 
The pollution haven hypothesis or pollution haven effect argues that a country 
with a lower than average level of environmental regulations will find itself with a 
comparative advantage in pollution-intensive production (Levinson, 2008). Therefore, 
countries with low environmental monitoring and regulations will attract MNE´s 
engaged in pollution-intensive production. Consequently, MNE´s will relocate their 
production facilities, while countries with the comparative advantage will become 
“havens” for the polluting industries. The rationale behind this sounds plausible: if it 
costs money to conform to more stringent environmental requirements in developed 
countries, profit maximizing firms would want to relocate their production activities 
(Javorcik &Wei, 2004). Consequently, the relocation of polluting industries to 
developing countries with less stringent environmental regulations would enhance 
pollution; directly through an increase in the scale of economic activity and 
transportation, as well as indirectly through changes in the composition of industries 
(Brunnermeier & Levinson, 2004).  
However, the findings in the literature to date do not show a clear pattern of this 
effect. Xing and Kolstad (2002) conducted an empirical study by examining the FDI of 
6 U.S. manufacturing industries in 1985 and 1990. Their cross-section data set covers 
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22 countries including 7 developing countries and 15 developed countries. In order to 
measure environmental regulation, Xing and Kolstad (2002) used sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
emissions in the host countries. The results show that host country emissions have an 
insignificant effect on FDI. Once the study uses instrumental variables for SO2 (infant 
mortality and population density) the results change dramatically. The results show that 
predicted host country emissions have a significant negative effect on FDI in high 
polluting industries. The effect suggests that for polluting industries, more lax 
environmental regulations do tend to attract foreign investment.  
A different conclusion is provided by Eskeland and Harrison (2003). Their study 
focuses on the relationship between pollution abatement costs and the pattern of foreign 
investment. The study investigated inbound FDI in 4-digit sectors in Côte d´Ivoire 
(1977-1987), Morocco (1985-1990), Venezuela (1983-1988), and Mexico (1984-1990) 
as well as U.S. outbound investment by sector. In order to measure pollution intensity 
the study used data on U.S. pollution abatement capital expenditures and operating costs 
from the PACE survey as well as data from the Industrial Pollution Projection System 
(IPPS).
20
 The results show an insignificant effect of pollution abatements costs and U.S. 
outbound FDI. Hence, the authors conclude that U.S. outbound FDI is highest in sectors 
with low abatement costs (Eskeland & Harrison, 2003). Based on these results, there is 
no evidence for the pollution haven hypothesis. De Santis and Stähler (2009) studied the 
effect of FDI on environmental policy stringency in a two country model with trade 
costs. Their results revealed if FDI is liberalized it does not lead to ecological dumping 
and is more likely to occur in the absence of FDI.  
                                                 
20
 The data comes from the U.S. Bureau of Census, Center for Economic Studies and was conducted by a 
World Bank research project in order to infer the level of industrial pollution in foreign countries. 
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Javorcik and Wei (2004) examined inbound FDI in transition economies in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union from multiple countries. The study used firm-level 
data rather than industry-level data. Therefore, the FDI data comes from a data set based 
on the results from a foreign investment survey conducted in 1995 for the period 1989-
1994. The fixed-effects regression analysis show some evidence that countries with less 
stringent environmental regulations (only taken for participation in treaties) are 
attracting more FDI. But the findings are not robust. Furthermore, the authors stated that 
there is no evidence suggesting that multinationals in pollution-intensive activities are 
more likely to invest in locations with weaker environmental standards (Javorcik & 
Wei, 2004).  
Cole and Elliot (2005) tried to explain the missing evidence for pollution havens 
by taking the role of factor endowments in the decision of an MNE to relocate or set up 
a plant in a foreign country into account. Their results indicate that Brazil and Mexico 
are two of the more likely contenders to do so. Furthermore, Cole and Elliot (2005) 
analysed U.S. multi-sector outbound FDI to Brazil and Mexico for the period 1989-
1994 at the three-digit U.S. SIC level of industry aggregation. Their independent 
variables to determine outbound FDI to Brazil and Mexico include the physical capital 
intensity of each sector, the sectors pollution abatement costs, market size, the wage 
differential between the U.S. and Brazil/Mexico, R&D expenditures, a proxy for 
economies of scale, and distance. By using fixed effects and random effects 
specifications the results show that pollution abatement costs in a U.S. industry is a 
statistically significant determinant of that industry’s FDI to Brazil and Mexico 
indicating evidence of a pollution haven effect (Cole & Elliot, 2005). 
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Wagner and Timmins (2009) investigated German outbound FDI flows by German 
manufacturing firms into different destination countries between 1996 and 2003. The 
study analysed 6 different manufacturing industries and used a two-step econometric 
procedure that explicitly controls for agglomeration effects and unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries. To determine environmental stringency the authors 
used a survey measure of environmental stringency developed by the World Economic 
Forum and published in the Global Competitiveness Report. Additional independent 
variables for the host country include accumulated FDI stock, GDP, corporate income 
tax, the exchange rate, the level of tariff protection, the literacy rate, tuberculosis cases, 
and distance. Wagner and Timmins (2009) results show statistically and economically 
significant evidence that more stringent environmental regulation deters FDI in the 
chemical industry. Consequently, this is interpreted as evidence of a pollution haven 
effect for the chemical industry (Wagner & Timmins, 2009). 
Spatareanu (2007) analysed data on new subsidiaries established in 16 Western 
European and 9 Central and Eastern European countries by the largest 10,000 firms 
operating in Europe during 1998 to 2001. By using the fixed effects logit and the Tobit 
specifications the results show that stronger environmental rules in the firm’s home 
economy relative to the host country are associated with a higher volume of FDI. 
Furthermore, industries with higher abatement costs are likely to undertake more FDI. 
However the results do not indicate that polluting industries are attracted more to 
countries with weaker environmental standards. 
There are several drawbacks in the existing literature that might have masked a 
pollution haven effect. In order to identify a pollution effect it is essential to apply a 
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measure of environmental stringency as a variable. To measure environmental 
stringency, researchers have used a variety of variables or proxies in the literature. One 
reason is that there is almost no data set that covers a long time period measuring the 
environmental stringency of various countries. Especially lower advanced economies do 
not publish a large amount of data on emissions or environmental stringency. Most of 
the existing literature therefore relies on U.S. data or solely analysed U.S. FDI and trade 
flows. Particularly the earlier studies solely examined plant births in the U.S. or inbound 
or outbound FDI from or into the U.S.. Furthermore, the literature identified two major 
drawbacks on the methodology of studies. On the one hand, earlier studies only used 
cross-sectional data. These studies tend to reject the existence of a pollution haven 
effect. The major drawback of using cross-sectional data is that it is not possible to 
control for unobserved attributes of countries or industries that are correlated with 
regulatory stringency and economic strength (Brunnermeier & Levinson, 2004). A 
country with an unobserved comparative advantage in a polluting good is likely to 
export that good and enact strict environmental regulations. The simplest solution to the 
problem of unobserved heterogeneity is to apply a panel data set and include fixed or 
random effects by country. These fixed or random effects models capture the 
unobserved characteristics of countries that make them likely to have both strict 
environmental regulations and high levels of activity (Levinson, 2008). On the other 
hand, an econometric issue confronting most of the studies is that economic activity and 
pollution regulations may be determined simultaneously. The pollution haven 
hypothesis suggests that environmental regulations affect exports, but the reverse may 
also be true; exports may affect regulation. Therefore, the econometric model has to be 
adjusted for endogeneity. In order to solve the problem of potential endogeneity the 
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study uses a subjective measure of environmental stringency. Furthermore, we use 
random-effects instead of a fixed-effects model due to the fact that some of our 
independent variables, e.g. distance, are time-invariant.    
6.3 Empirical Model 
Germany is an attractive country for testing the pollution haven hypothesis for 
numerous reasons. Firstly, Germany is the country with the most severe and strict 
environmental standards and regulations (World Economic Forum et al., 2000-2006). 
Furthermore, through the central location, German firms have a large pool of possible 
destinations to invest that are located close to Germany but significantly differ in 
country attributes such as market size, wages, country risk and/or in environmental 
stringency (Wagner & Timmins, 2009). This suggests that, ceteris paribus, pollution 
intensive industries in Germany have a stronger incentive to set up production facilities 
in foreign destinations than they do in most other countries in the world. Hence, we 
expect to find a negative relationship between German outbound FDI and 
environmental regulations. This implies that German companies prefer to invest in 
countries with low environmental regulations. Consequently, this leads to the first 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  Host countries that have lower environmental regulations compared to 
Germany will attract significantly higher German outbound FDI. 
Furthermore, the German manufacturing industry is highly competitive and 
accounts for 30% of Germany’s gross value creation and employs 26% of the German 
workforce (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008). This also affects the pattern of German FDI 
which is rather concentrated. There are four major industries that are responsible for 
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approximately 80% of the undertaken FDI within the manufacturing industry, i.e. 
automotive, chemical, electric, and engineering. By distinguishing between “clean” and 
“dirty” industries we expect that the tendency to shift production to countries with lower 
environmental standards is more pronounced for dirty industries. Hence, the second 
hypothesis results to: 
Hypothesis 2:    “Dirty” industries will show a negative statistically significant 
effect between FDI and environmental regulations. In contrast, the defined “clean” 
industries will not present a negative statistically significant effect.  
Besides that, the study expects to find a positive relationship between FDI and the 
variables Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDPPC), population, the KOF index of 
globalisation, innovation, government effectiveness, as well as labour market flexibility. 
These expected positive relationships, expressed through a positive statistically 
significant coefficient in the regression analysis, would indicate that German outbound 
FDI is attracted. Furthermore, the study expects to find a negative relationship between 
FDI and the variables distance, inflation, and labour costs.  
This negative relationship, expressed through a negative statistically significant 
coefficient, will deter German outbound FDI in host countries. By including all the 
variables in the estimation the following equation is obtained: 
ln 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2ln 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3ln𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽6𝐾𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽10𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽11𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
Where i denotes country and t denotes year. 
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6.4 Panel Data Description 
For testing the pollution haven hypothesis we use German FDI flows panel data 
by destination country as well as German FDI flows by country and four major 
industries from the manufacturing sector as the dependent variable.
21
 Data was taken 
from the Deutsche Bundesbank which publishes data on Total outbound FDI from the 
industries as well as breaks down outbound FDI within the manufacturing industry into 
four major sectors.
22
 Unfortunately, the Deutsche Bundesbank does not publish further 
data on other branches within the manufacturing industry and their outbound FDI. The 
sample for Total outbound FDI comprises flow data for the period from 2000 to 2006 
and covers all 89 destination countries that are included in the Deutsche Bundesbank 
report. Due to data constraints 39 countries are included in the sample for Total German 
outbound FDI.
23
 The country coverage for the industry samples is limited since the 
Deutsche Bundesbank provides less data on the industry level. Therefore, the sample for 
the chemical, automobile, electrical, and engineering industry consists of 35 countries.  
In line with the current literature we use pollution abatement expenditures to 
classify industries according to their pollution intensity (Wagner & Timmins, 2009). An 
industry with high pollution abatement expenditures is expected to have a larger 
incentive to set up production facilities abroad. In addition, the higher the share of 
investments in pollution abatement on total investments, the more an industry faces a 
                                                 
21
 German enterprises and households are required by law to report all direct and indirect holdings of 10% 
or more of the capital shares or voting rights in a foreign company which has a balance sheet total of 
more than three million Euros or the equivalent of three million Euros in a different currency. In addition, 
all branch offices or permanent establishments in a foreign country with operating assets of three million 
Euros or more have to be reported to the Deutsche Bundesbank.  
22
 The industries and their WZ 2008 codes are C20 – manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
(chemical), C27 – manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus (electrical), C28 - manufacture of 
machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified (engineering), and C29 – manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (automobile). 
23
 In particular, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Saudi Arabia, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe were excluded from all samples.  
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cost disadvantage in countries with strict environmental regulations. The data is 
collected by the German Federal Bureau of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt) and is 
available from 2002 to 2005.
24
 Figure 6-1 shows that the chemical industry has the 
highest share of pollution abatement investment in total investment. The average share 
for the chemical industry per year is 6.15% between 2002 and 2005. The mean for the 
total manufacturing industry is 2.82% over this time period. Based on this data, the 
cleanest industry in the sample is the electrical industry with 0.8% followed by the 
engineering industry with 1.05%. The second most polluting industry is the automobile 
industry with 1.72%, slightly under the mean for the total manufacturing industry.  
 
Figure 6-1: The share of pollution abatement investment in total investment
25
 
In order to capture the effects of the stringency of environmental regulations 
(STRINGENCY) of German FDI flows, the study uses a variable taken from the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) published by the World Economic Forum (Spatareanu, 
                                                 
24
 The German Federal Bureau of Statistics publishes the data in its “Fachserie 19, Reihe 3.1 Investitionen 
für den Umweltschutz im Produzierenden Gewerbe”. 
25
 Own calculation based on data from the German Federal Bureau of Statistics (Fachserie 19, Reihe 3.1). 
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2007; Wagner & Timmins, 2009).
26
 There are various advantages of using the GCR 
index. Most of the indices used in previous studies lack on country coverage and were 
not available on an annual basis. This is one reason that previous studies could not 
control for unobserved heterogeneity by applying a panel data set. Instead, most studies 
relied on U.S. pollution abatement data that appears to be endogenous. The GCR index 
can overcome such drawbacks since it is a subjective measure of environmental 
stringency determined by leading decision makers who decide on FDI flows. In 
addition, the GCR ranking is available for all countries in the sample and covers the 
time period of 2000 until 2006.  
Apart from analyzing the effect of environmental stringency we will control for 
several other variables, i.e. market size, host country wages, transportation costs, FDI 
restrictions, institutional quality, innovation, country risk, and labour market flexibility. 
In order to determine the market size the study uses GDP (constant prices in U.S. 
Dollars) in each country in the years 2000-2006. The theoretical link between market 
size and FDI is that FDI is supposed to be attracted by larger and more profitable 
markets. To lessen the effect of large outliers the study applies the logarithm of GDP. 
The variable comes from the World Economic Outlook Database 2008 provided by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Host country wages can be best measured and 
compared through data on hourly compensation rates in various countries. 
Unfortunately, data on labour costs and specifically data for hourly compensation rates 
in various countries is very scarce since not all countries included in the sample report 
                                                 
26
 In order to measure environmental stringency the GCR survey asked respondents the following 
question: “Is the stringency of overall environmental regulations lax compared to most other countries or 
among the worlds most stringent?” Business executives had to rank their country on a scale between 7 for 
countries with the most stringent environmental regulations and 1 for the countries with the most lax 
environmental regulations. 
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statistics to a labour organisation or to a central agency. Especially, non-member 
countries of the EU or OECD do not report these data. Therefore, hourly compensation 
rates (WAGE) are solely available for 42 countries in the sample.
27
 The proxy for 
transportation costs is the direct-distance (DIST) between the source countries capital 
(Berlin) and the capital of the host country in kilometers. The assumption is that the 
closer a country is located to the source country, the lower the transportation costs. 
FDI is also affected by the extent of openness (OPENESS) of an economy. In 
order to control for this we use KOF Index of Globalisation developed by Dreher (2006) 
and updated by Dreher, Gaston, and Martens (2008). The KOF index covers the 
economic, social and political dimensions of globalisation. The assumption is that a 
country with a high ranking in the KOF index will be more attractive for receiving more 
FDI. The determinant institutional quality is covered through a government indicator 
(GOV) in the host countries provided by the World Bank. The study assumes that a 
higher value corresponds to better governance outcomes and therefore will attract 
German outbound FDI. We furthermore assume that the relocation of production is also 
driven by the innovative environment host countries offer. In particular, technology-
intensive firms tend to invest in locations with high agglomeration in order to profit 
from spillovers. Hence, we assume that shifting production to foreign locations is also 
affected by the pursuit to perform R&D activities and to profit from firm spillovers. To 
control for this we use OECD patent data, i.e. how many patents foreign firms hold in 
                                                 
27
 In the data set for the manufacturing industries data is missing for Turkey, Malaysia, India, Argentina, 
and for the Russian Federation. In addition, the data comes from various sources namely the U.S. 
Department of Labour, Bureau of Labour statistics (BLS), Eurostat (covering data for Romania, Slovenia, 
and Latvia), and the data for China comes from a special report published by the BLS. Additionally, data 
from China is only available from 2002-2004. The compensation rates published in Euros (Eurostat) were 
converted into U.S. Dollars using annual average exchange rates taken from the International Financial 
Statistics. 
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that particular host country. To account for the determinant country risk the study uses 
the annual percent change of average consumer prices expressed through the inflation 
rate (INFL). The data is available for all countries and all years in the sample and also 
comes from the IMF World Economic Outlook database. A higher inflation rate would 
indicate political instability and hence a greater country risk. A higher value would 
indicate a lower country risk. In general, it is assumed that a higher country risk would 
be a deterrent for FDI expressed through high annual changes in the inflation rate. 
Finally, to control for labour market flexibility and regulations we use a proxy for the 
Flexibility in Hiring and Firing Practices also from the GCR (2000-2007). It is assumed 
that FDI is attracted by countries with more flexible labour market regulations. Table 6-
1 provides an overview and definition of the applied variables. 
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Table 6-1: Overview and definition of variables 
Variables Definition Source Proxy for Author(s) 
FDI Total amount of FDI from 
Germany to various destination 
countries in €. Expressed in 
logarithmic form 
Statistisches Bundesamt 
Sonderveröffentlichung 10, 
“Bestandserhebung über 
Direktinvestitionen” 
Dependent 
Variable 
Xing & Kolstad 
(2002) 
Eskeland & 
Harrison (2003) 
Cole & Elliot 
(2005) 
Wagner & 
Timmins (2007) 
GDP (GDP) GDP at current prices in US$. 
Expressed in logarithmic form 
International Monetary 
Fund: World Economic 
Outlook Database 2008 
Market size Xing & Kolstad 
(2002) 
Javorcik & Wei 
(2004) 
Wagner & 
Timmins (2007) 
Spatareanu (2007) 
Distance (DIST) The distance between the host 
country capital to the destination 
country capital as the crow flies 
in km. Expressed in logarithmic 
form 
 Transportation 
costs 
Javorcik & Wei 
(2004) 
Cole & Elliot 
(2005) 
Wagner & 
Timmins (2007) 
Inflation rate (INFL) Annual change. Expressed in 
percentages 
International Monetary Fund 
World Economic Outlook 
Database 2008 
Country risk  
INNOVATION Patents hold by foreign firms in 
particular host country 
OECD R&D  
Governance (GOV) Ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher values corresponding to 
better governance outcomes 
World Bank Institutional 
quality 
 
KOF Index of 
Globalisation (KOF) 
Higher values denote more 
globalisation 
Dreher (2006): Does 
Globalisation Affect 
Growth? Evidence from a 
new Index of Globalisation, 
Applied Economics 38, 10: 
1091-1110. 
FDI restriction 
in host countries 
 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Report (GCR) 
flexibility in hiring 
and firing practices 
“Flexibility” (FLEX) 
Ranges from 7 for most flexible 
regulations, to 1 for most rigid 
Global Competitiveness 
Report 2000 - 2007 
Labour market 
flexibility 
Spatareanu (2007) 
GCR stringency of 
environmental 
regulations 
(STRINGENCY) 
Ranges from 7 for most 
stringent, to 1 for most lax 
Global Competitiveness 
Report 2000 - 2007 
Environmental 
stringency 
Wagner & 
Timmins (2007) 
Spatareanu (2007) 
Labour costs (WAGE) Annual Labour compensation 
per employee (PPP) in US$ 
Source OECD 
Database/Eurostat Database 
Host country 
wages 
Eskeland & 
Harrison (2003) 
Cole & Elliot 
(2005) 
OECD Equal to 1 if country is member 
and 0 otherwise 
CIA The World Factbook  Cave & Blomquist 
(2008) 
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Table 6-2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of the data sample. As 
mentioned above, data for labour costs and especially data on hourly compensation rates 
in various countries is very scarce. Therefore, the variable WAGE is limited to 283 
observations. The KOF Index did not include Hong Kong and Taiwan and due to a 
missing value in the Deutsche Bundesbank report from the Philippines in 2006, the total 
number of observations is 268. 
Table 6-2: Descriptive Statistics Total German outbound FDI 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnFDI 268 8.221 1.933 3.258 12.22 
lnGDP 269 19.082 1.671 15.543 23.303 
lnDIST 269 7.460 1.164 5.662 9.806 
INFL 269 3.526 4.205 -1.08 45.66 
INNOVATION 269 96.49 227.36 0 1201 
KOF 269 74.88 11.739 50.51 93.65 
FLEX 269 3.594 0.921 1.9 6.3 
WAGE 269 14.32 9.707 0.57 41.05 
STRINGENCY 269 5.117 0.985 2.8 6.7 
GOV 269 1.251 0.745 -0.352 2.341 
OECD 287 0.658  0 1 
 
6.5 Empirical Results 
6.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Before turning to the empirical results, we will give an overview of important 
descriptive findings in the data set. This includes the question of whether German 
industries in the sample with high pollution abatement expenditures are likely to 
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undertake more FDI or not. Firstly, Figure 6-2 shows the annual change in percentage 
of Total German outbound FDI as well as from the industries included in the sample. It 
can be observed that there was a major decline during the period between 2000 and 
2002. During this period global FDI flows declined originating from weak economic 
growth, tumbling stock markets and institutional factors such as deceleration of 
privatisation in several countries (UNCTAD, 2003). 
 
Figure 6-2: Annual change of outbound FDI in percent 
In order to find out if pollution intensive industries from Germany undertake more 
FDI than less polluting industries, the study will compare the findings from the share of 
pollution abatement investment in total investment and the volume of expenditures for 
pollution abatement with the actual data on FDI flows. Figure 6-3 shows the volume of 
FDI from the four industries included in the sample.  
The automobile industry is the industry that undertakes the most FDI across all 
industries in the sample. On average the industry invested € 93.6 billion per year in the 
period 2000 to 2006. With an average of € 39.5 billion per year the chemical industry 
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ranks second. The electrical and engineering industries invest far less with an average of 
€ 18.7 billion and € 14.8 billion. Additionally, it can be observed that the automobile 
and chemical industry reduced FDI during the period. On average the FDI from the 
automobile industry declined by 0.42% per year and FDI from the chemical industry 
declined by 3.93% per year. In contrast, the electrical and engineering industry 
increased FDI by 4.51%, respectively 2.46% per year. Bearing in mind that the 
automobile and chemical industry are the most polluting industries in the sample with 
6.15% investment in pollution abatement in total investment, and 1.72% respectively, it 
is illustrated that those two industries are also the most likely to undertake more FDI 
compared to the “clean” industries in the sample (see Figure 6-1). This finding is in line 
with the findings of Spatareanu (2007).  
 
Figure 6-3: Total outbound FDI by industry in billion € 
In order to analyse whether German companies prefer to invest in countries with 
low environmental regulations, it has to be defined which countries actually have 
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relatively low environmental regulations compared to Germany (GCR 2000-2006). The 
mean value for Germany during the period 2000 to 2006 is 6.64 on a scale ranging from 
1 to 7, where 7 indicates the most severe regulations. This is also the highest value 
across all countries in the sample. The mean value across all countries in the sample is 
4.28. Therefore, we define all countries with a value under the mean of 4.28 as countries 
with low environmental regulations compared to Germany. This splits the sample into 
42 low regulated countries and 38 countries with strict environmental regulations. By 
adding the annual growth rate of German outbound FDI in relation to the environmental 
stringency of the two groups it is possible to observe which group has the highest 
annual growth rates of receiving German outbound FDI.  
 
Figure 6-4: German FDI growth rates of countries with low/strict regulations 
Figure 6-4 shows that the growth rates of low regulated countries outperform the 
growth rates of the strict regulated countries in almost every year. Solely during the 
downturn in 2002 and 2003, strict regulated countries had slightly higher growth rates 
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compared to low regulated countries. The green trend line clearly shows that countries 
with low regulations have a positive linear trend in the sample period, whereas the red 
trend line shows a negative trend for the strict regulated countries. This illustration only 
takes the growth rates in relation to the environmental stringency of a country on a 
yearly basis into account but excludes all other factors such as volume of FDI or other 
explanatory variables that might explain FDI flows.  
6.5.2 Empirical Results on an aggregated level 
The results of the panel regression on an aggregated level are shown in Table 6-
3.
28,29
 In particular, the results show that six out of the eleven variables are statistically 
significant. The variable for market size GDP is significant at the 1% level. The variable 
DIST shows the expected sign, which means that economies in proximity to Germany 
attract German FDI, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The FLEX shows a 
negative sign but is not significant. The KOF globalisation index doesn’t have the 
expected sign but is at the same time not statistically significant in this analysis. The 
variable for Innovation is not significant whereas the variable for institutional quality 
(GOV) shows the expected sign and is significant at the 5% level. The variable WAGE 
is highly significant at the 1% level and has the expected negative sign. The negative 
sign confirms the assumption that German outbound FDI is attracted to countries with 
lower labour costs or countries with lower hourly compensation rates. The mean value 
for hourly compensation rates in Germany is $28.58 per hour, which differs strongly 
                                                 
28
 In general, panel regressions suffer from non-stationarity. In order to check whether the panel shows 
non-stationarity we applied the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for each independent variable. There were 
no signs of non-stationarity. 
29
 The Wald chi2 test also indicates that the model itself is highly significant and that all variables should 
be included in the model. We have also controlled for the issue of multicollinerarity. An examination of 
the correlations of the independent variables revealed that multicollinearity is not exerting an undue 
influence on the results. Also, the corresponding variance inflation factors (VIF) do not reach critical 
values. 
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from the mean value in the sample of $13.95 per hour. Since the numbers are based on 
the manufacturing sector it can be assumed that the German manufacturing sector has a 
clear disadvantage in terms of labour costs compared to other countries.  
Table 6-3: Determinants of Total German outbound FDI 
 Random-Effects Regression Fixed-Effects Regression 
Variable Coefficients Z-Value 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficients t-Value 
Standard 
Error 
lnGDP 0.895*** 10.93 0.084 0.969*** 5.76 0.106 
lnDIST -0.595*** -4.02 0.148    
INFL -0.007+ -1.28 0.005 -0.007+ -1.02 0.007 
INNOVATION -0.0001+ -0.05 0.002 -0.0004+ -1.43 0.0003 
KOF -0.013** -1.96 0.010 -0.019+ -1.06 0.018 
FLEX 0.0003+ -0.01 0.040 0.001+ 0.05 0.036 
STRINGENCY -0.153** -2.94 0.052 -0.173** -2.93 0.059 
OECD 1.092** 1.89 0.576    
WAGE -0.019*** -3.95 0.004 -0.021** -2.37 0.009 
GOV 0.248* 1.84 0.135 0.174+ 1.04 0.167 
Constant -23.244*** -7.66 1.912 -28.998 6.08 -4.767 
Overall R
2
 0.6549 0.3515 
Observations 268 268 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance. 
German outbound FDI is also attracted to countries that are OECD members since 
the coefficient has a positive sign and is also statistically significant at the 10% level. 
With respect to the effect of environmental stringency we find that STRINGENCY in 
host countries has a negative statistically significant effect on German outbound FDI. 
The variable is statistically significant at the 5% level. This fact confirms the hypothesis 
that higher environmental regulations in host countries deter German outbound FDI in 
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those countries. Additionally, this result provides evidence for a “pollution haven 
effect” in German outbound FDI. To express the result in relation to each other and to 
show how important the result is economically, the result can be described as semi-
elasticity. This means that, all else being equal, a change by one unit in environmental 
regulations by a certain country (e.g. from 3 to 4) will cause a decrease of 
approximately 15% of receiving German FDI. In summary, German companies 
investing abroad seem to take the costs through differences in environmental regulations 
across various countries into account. Consequently, German companies try to 
circumvent the additional costs in order to comply with environmental regulations in 
Germany by investing more in lower regulated countries and relocating production 
facilities towards these countries. 
In order to support this result and to provide evidence for a “pollution haven 
effect” in the manufacturing sector the article will also outline FDI patterns on the 
industry level.    
6.5.3 Empirical Results on the industry level 
Since data on the industry level is very scarce in terms of country coverage and 
therefore the number of observations is relatively low, the study will apply a different 
empirical model for all regression analyses on the industry level. The results obtained 
from applying a random effects or fixed effects model did not show any significant 
results due to relatively low number of observations. All independent variables used in 
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the regressions were insignificant and could not be interpreted. Therefore, the data on 
the industry level will be analysed by using the OLS technique.
30
  
The chemical industry is one of the industries defined as a “dirty” industry. This 
was outlined based on the industries expenditures for pollution abatement. Therefore, 
the chemical industry is the industry which is most likely to show a “pollution haven 
effect”. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics indicate that the countries in the sample 
are on average more advanced economies.
31
 The empirical results from the 
manufacturing industries are shown in Table 6-4. 
The results from the regression analysis for the chemical industry confirm the 
previous results from the Total German outbound FDI sample. Again, GDP is highly 
significant at the 1% with a positive coefficient. The variable DIST and FLEX are both 
significant and also show the expected sign. INFL is significant at the 1% level and has 
a negative sign. This means that companies in the German chemical industry are 
attracted to secure markets with a low country risk. This is also confirmed through the 
KOF index which is statistically significant at the 1% level and shows a positive sign 
indicating that low trade barriers and openness towards globalisation is an important 
determinant for the German chemical industry. 
 
                                                 
30
 The major drawback of this technique is that it is not possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
and therefore the results may be biased as discussed earlier. 
31
 The relatively high mean value on the globalization index shows that more advanced economies are 
included in the sample. In addition, data on the KOF index for Hong Kong as well as data on FDI flows 
to Romania and Slovakia for 2000 is not available. Moreover, there is no available data on labour costs in 
China for the years 2000, 2001, 2005 and 2006. For that reason, China was dropped for the years of 
missing data. Additionally, Hong Kong was completely dropped from the sample and Romania and 
Slovakia were dropped for the year 2000.Therefore, the total number of observations is 190 in the sample 
for the chemical industry. 
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Table 6-4: Determinants of German outbound FDI in the manufacturing industry 
 Coefficients OLS 
Variable Chemical Automobile Electric Engineering 
lnGDP 0.594 (6.29)*** 0.898 (9.26)*** 0.961 (9.77)*** 0.904 (14.36)*** 
lnDIST -0.225 (2.72)** 0.155 (1.43)+ -0.446 (-4.70)*** -0.338 (-3.57)*** 
INFL -0.074 (-3.79)*** -0.034 (-1.32) -0.005 (-0.26)+ -0.001 (-0.11)+ 
GOV -0.340 (-1.71)* -1.952 (-6.72)*** -0.066 (-0.31)+ -0.441 (-2.04)** 
KOF 0.067 (4.98)*** 0.104 (6.57)*** 0.003 (0.29)+ 0.047 (3.76)*** 
FLEX -0.200 (-2.69)** 0.316 (4.02)*** 0.274 (3.13)** 0.192 (3.93)*** 
STRINGENCY -0.284 (-2.15)** 0.671 (4.02)*** 0.317 (1.96)** 0.515 (4.00)*** 
WAGE -0.016 (-1.48)+ -0.068 (-5.22)*** -0.086 (-6.27)*** -0.059 (-5.83)*** 
OECD -0.202 (-0.82)+ 0.978 (3.48)*** 0.121 (0.54)+ -0.634 (-3.51)*** 
INNOVATION 0.002 (9.26)*** 0.001 (3.48)*** 0.001 (3.37)** 0.004 (2.61)** 
Constant -18.446 (-6.39) -42.878 (-10.37) -37.416 (-7.59) -38.141 (-12.85) 
R
2
 0.7299 0.6803 0.6742 0.6522 
Observations 187 180 169 180 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance; Note: t values in brackets 
In addition, the variables INNOVATION and GOV are both significant and show 
the expected positive sign. Furthermore, the variable WAGE is not significant but 
shows the expected negative sign. But most importantly, the measure of STRINGENCY 
is statistically significant at the 5% level and also shows a negative sign. The coefficient 
indicates that, all else being equal, a country changing its environmental regulations by 
one unit will cause a decrease of 28.4% in receiving German FDI. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that the chemical industry, defined as a “dirty” industry, is attracted to 
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countries with low environmental regulations is statistically confirmed. This further 
supports the existence of a “pollution haven effect”. 
The second industry defined as “dirty” in the sample is the automobile industry. 
The descriptive statistics are very similar compared to the sample of the chemical.
32
 The 
results show several surprising effects. First of all, the variable GDP, the proxy for 
market size, is again highly statistically significant in this regression. The variable DIST 
is not significant in this regression. On the other side, the variable FLEX in labour 
markets is statistically significant at the 1% level and shows the expected sign. The 
variable WAGE shows the expected sign and is highly significant. The variable GOV is 
highly significant and reports a negative sign. The results show that companies in the 
automobile industry are attracted to countries with closer distance, lower inflation rates, 
less institutional quality but more flexible labour markets. In general, all these 
determinants indicate cost savings, especially in the production process. Furthermore, 
companies in the automobile industry are attracted to host countries with low trade 
barriers as well as openness to globalisation, indicated through the positive and 
statistically significant relationship between German FDI and the KOF index. Since the 
automobile industry is defined as “dirty” in this study it was expected to find a negative 
statistically significant relationship between German FDI and the STRINGENCY in 
host countries. As the results show, there is a significant relationship but it does not 
show the expected sign. Consequently, the second proposed hypothesis in this study 
cannot be confirmed for the automobile industry. In fact, the results indicate that 
companies in the automobile industry are attracted to countries with high environmental 
                                                 
32
 Data for Luxembourg was not available for the automobile industry and is therefore not included in this 
sample. Hence, the number of observations is reduced to 180. 
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regulations. This could possibly reflect a turnaround in German automotive industry’s 
strategically environmental consciousness with regard to future market potential. In 
particular, consumers of environmental stringent countries have developed a strong 
demand for environmentally efficient products, i.e. hybrid fuel technologies which will 
continue to rise in the future. An explanation provided by Rauscher (2009) states that 
everything else being equal, tighter environmental standards retard rather than 
accelerate long-term economic growth despite potentially substantial spill-overs in the 
green R&D sector. In addition, the variable INNOVATION, highly significant and 
positive, supports the result. Hence, our results give support for the Porter hypothesis 
which states that environmental regulation causes cost reducing innovation and 
promotes competitiveness (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). 
The electric industry is the first defined as a “clean” industry in the sample. 
Therefore, the paper does not expect to find a negative relationship between German 
outbound FDI and environmental regulations in the host country. The results of the 
regression analysis are presented in Table 6-4.
33
 The variable for market size GDP is 
again statistically significant at the 1% level. Also the variable DIST in this regression 
is significant at the 1% level and shows a negative sign. In contrast to the defined 
“dirty” industries, DIST or close proximity to Germany has an influential impact on 
receiving German FDI in the electric industry. The variables INFL and GOV are not 
statistically significant for the electric industry. The KOF index also shows the expected 
sign but slightly fails to be significant at the 10% level. Additionally, the variables 
WAGE, INNOVATION and FLEX show the expected signs and are highly significant. 
                                                 
33
 Due to data constraints for German FDI flows to Romania (2000, 2003, and 2005), Slovakia (2000, 
2002), Ireland (2002) and Norway for all years in the sample period, the number of observations is 
reduced to 169. 
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As expected, the variable STRINGENCY does not show a negative sign and therefore 
supports the second hypothesis. In fact, the coefficient shows a positive sign and is 
highly significant. As a consequence, German companies in the electric industry prefer 
to invest in countries that have high environmental regulations. The second defined 
“clean” industry in the sample is the engineering industry. Regarding the second 
hypothesis, we expect the same findings as for the electric industry. The results are 
similar to those obtained from the electric industry with the exceptions that the variables 
KOF and OECD are statistically significant. The variable DIST is statistically 
significant and reports a negative sign. Surprisingly, this result regarding DIST differs 
from the regression results obtained from the defined “dirty” chemical industry. This 
indicates that DIST is an important determinant for the “clean” industries, whereas the 
contrary applies for the “dirty” industry in the sample. Consequently, it can be 
maintained that firms engaged in “clean” industries prefer investment destinations close 
to their home market as they move both consciously and physically up their 
environmental value-added chains. One may argue, occasioned inter alia by rising 
living standards and possible market enlargement effects - and partly due to changes in 
their production and marketing strategies, that the DIST variable effects may now rest 
more upon spatial optimization of an interrelated set of value-added activities in the 
"clean" industries. In contrast, firms engaged in “dirty” industries appear to be still 
adhering to more traditional motives of superficial myopic cost minimization strategies 
without taking into account the mid- and long term strategic asset effects of sustaining a 
“dirty” image. 
The variable INNOVATION shows the expected sign and is also significant. In 
addition, the variables KOF and FLEX are significant. Also firms in the engineering 
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industry are attracted to countries with lower wages compared to Germany. Concerning 
the measure of STRINGENCY, the results show a positive significant relationship 
between environmental stringency and German outbound FDI. Consequently, the results 
confirm the second proposed hypothesis that there is no negative relationship between 
German FDI and environmental regulations in host countries across “clean” industries. 
6.6 Discussion 
The study proposed two hypotheses in order to provide evidence for a pollution 
haven effect in German outbound FDI. Therefore, the study applies an empirical model 
to detect a relationship between environmental regulations and German outbound FDI. 
The novelties in this study are the application of customized FDI determinants for the 
source country Germany as well as the assembly of the variables in connection with the 
environmental variable. The environmental variable, taken from the GCR, is a 
subjective measure of environmental stringency determined by leading decision makers 
who decide on FDI flows. Consequently, the environmental variable does not suffer 
from potential endogeneity. In addition, the data for the GCR environmental stringency 
index is available for the investigated sample period from 2000 until 2006. Therefore, 
the index can be included in a panel data set and can overcome the drawbacks of 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
The results of the regression analysis for Total German outbound FDI are 
multifarious. The results show a negative statistically significant relationship between 
environmental regulations and German outbound FDI. This indicates that German FDI 
is attracted to countries with lower environmental regulations. More precisely, all else 
being equal, an increase by one unit in environmental regulations by a certain country 
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will cause a decrease of approx. 15% of receiving German FDI. This finding strongly 
supports the first hypothesis and provides evidence for a pollution haven effect in 
German outbound FDI. Consequently, the difference in environmental regulations 
across countries can be seen as an important determinant in explaining German 
outbound FDI. Therefore, it can be argued that German companies try to circumvent the 
costs related to severe environmental regulations in Germany by investing more in 
countries with lower environmental regulations and possibly shifting production 
facilities towards these countries. 
A major contributor of FDI in Germany is the manufacturing sector. The sector 
accounts for 18% of total German outbound FDI. In order to provide further evidence 
for a pollution haven effect the study also investigates German outbound FDI in various 
industries in the manufacturing sector. Based on the data for the share of pollution 
abatement investment in total investment, the study defines “dirty” and “clean” 
industries that are included in the sample. Consequently, the second hypothesis states 
that there is a negative statistically significant relationship between German outbound 
FDI in “dirty” industries and environmental regulations in destination countries, 
whereas the “clean” industries do not show the effect. This hypothesis is confirmed for 
the chemical industry but has to be rejected for the automobile industry. An explanation 
for this outcome is that the share of pollution abatement investment in total investment 
in the chemical industry is approximately 3.5 times (6.15% vs. 1.72%) higher compared 
to the automobile industry. This fact supports the assumption that costs related to 
comply with environmental standards influence decisions on investments. This fact can 
only be confirmed if the costs represent a significant fraction of the total costs. Another 
explanation would be a turnaround in the demand for environmentally efficient products 
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in the automotive industry. In contrast, the defined “clean” industries do not show a 
negative statistically significant effect, which further confirms the second hypothesis. 
Additionally, the results support the assumption that German outbound FDI is attracted 
to countries with large domestic markets as well as to countries with significantly lower 
labour costs. Furthermore, in almost all regression analyses, the openness to 
globalisation of a certain country is an important determinant for German outbound 
FDI.  
The limitation of the study is the shortage of data. Firstly, data on hourly 
compensation rates or an equivalent measure of labour costs has not been significantly 
published or reported by various countries. Furthermore, data on German FDI flows is 
only published for a limited number of industries and countries. Due to the data 
limitation, it is not possible for the study to apply an empirical model that controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity on the industry level. The limited size of the data and the 
imperfect coverage of the labour costs data suggest that future studies should 
concentrate on expanding the data set and industries covered. It would also be 
appropriate to investigate other methods of collecting FDI data, for example, to apply 
firm-level data on investment decisions. 
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7 Conclusion and Outlook 
Modern professional sport teams are complex businesses, intrinsically concerned 
with matters of economics and finance (Morrow, 2003). This dissertation extracts some 
managerial decisions and regulations that influence this complexity. Beginning with a 
key element of the industry, namely, the league structure that is essential to the 
production of the sport product, Chapter 2 demonstrates the influence of sport’s 
governing bodies and the ways in which they arrange league structures. In a bid to 
increase the attractiveness of the game for spectators and generate additional revenues, 
European basketball leagues adopted a shorter shot clock in 2000. My empirical 
analysis revealed that though this rule change may have enhanced attractiveness in 
terms of scoring, it simultaneously led to decreased competitive balance, thus 
establishing a trade-off between two desired outcomes. To evaluate and generalize these 
results, comparable research in other sports that have adjusted their rules would be 
helpful. 
The next two chapters emphasize the financial performance of professional sport 
teams. I first addressed whether the introduction of a new CBA improved managerial 
technical efficiency, in terms of maximizing team values and revenue generation. The 
average efficiencies increased by up to 9 percentage points, compared with before the 
new CBA was established for the NHL, and the ten least efficient teams benefited even 
more, in that their average efficiency improved up to 14 percentage points. To explicate 
the surprising result that sporting performance influenced neither team values nor team 
revenues, I then presented an empirical study of the differences in motives between 
North American and European team sports. Athletic achievement had significant 
influences on financial performance only among EPL clubs, not for teams in North 
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American major leagues, which supported the results from the previous chapter. In 
addition, the DEA efficiency analyses indicated a predominant sporting focus among 
EPL teams, whereas North American major league franchises tended to be more 
business-oriented organizations. Further research might extend and confirm these 
findings by analyzing whether other European sport leagues exhibit similar results with 
regard to their sport and financial performance. 
Beyond these insights into the impacts of decisions by governing bodies and team 
owners, Chapter 5 spotlights individual players and the determinants of their 
remuneration. Specifically, I tested whether performance consistency is rewarded. This 
initial application of a longitudinal data set revealed findings that contradicted the 
results of previous research: I found strong evidence of a salary premium for players 
who perform inconsistently. Controlling for individual player characteristics and 
performance indicators, a one standard deviation increase in inconsistency earned the 
player a salary surplus of up to 92%, depending on the econometric model. Studies of 
performance consistency are very rare, so manifold research opportunities arise from 
this analysis. For example, as a robustness check, a cross-sport evaluation would be 
helpful. Panel data from professional basketball, football, and hockey players could 
offer a revealing comparison to determine if inconsistent player evaluations improve 
salaries across the board, or if sports-related differences appear in the results.  
One of the most promising research streams for sports economics relies on the 
increasing availability of vast amounts of new data, as connected with the still poorly 
defined term “big data.” Such data come from various sources and may not be publicly 
available. For example, the NBA has equipped every arena with a data collection 
system called SportVU that measures each player’s every move by analyzing optical 
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tracking data, recorded through several cameras throughout the arena. In one of the first 
studies to analyze these data, Cervone et al. (2014) propose a new metric to measure 
performance value in the NBA, in which each possession takes a value. Then the 
derived value is based on the probability of a made basket, which is equal to the total 
number of expected points that will result from a possession, or expected possession 
value (EPV). Because the EPV assigns a point value to every tactical option available at 
each moment of a possession, it can reveal the decisive moment that led to an open shot, 
instead of merely capturing the open shot, a current box score metrics do. The EPV also 
quantifies a player’s combined offensive value, taking into account every single action 
over a given time span and summarizing it as a single value. Comparing this value 
across players in turn offers a more accurate estimate of performance that might help 
explain wage dispersions. For European soccer, similar data are collected by Opta 
Sports. Yet a major limitation remains, in that these big data demand considerable 
resources to be analyzed, and few professional sports teams employ sufficiently well-
equipped statisticians. This gap might be why Manchester City FC publicly released all 
the data collected about it by Opta Sports for the entire 2012–13 season. With a 
crowdsourcing model, Manchester City FC is seeking to learn how to use its data more 
effectively and efficiently. 
Finally, professional sport teams likely include various data sources in their 
decision-making processes as they seek to optimize their operations, maximize game 
day revenues, and earn more from their sponsorships and merchandise operations. 
Experts and team owners highlight the benefits of WiFi-equipped arenas, which allow 
teams to collect personalized, real-time data about their attendees, for segmentation and 
profiling purposes. According to team owners, an average purchase includes three 
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tickets, which means that they collect purchase data from only about one-third of the 
attendees in the arena; the other two-thirds are virtually anonymous. Data gathered from 
WiFi operations could help optimize waiting queues for food and beverage vendors or 
even reducing waiting times for restrooms. By exploiting such information and data, 
teams can enhance the fans´ experience and increase game day revenues. An embedded 
social media strategy within organizations, to collect data about fan behavior, similarly 
appears increasingly imperative as a means to increase fans’ engagement.  
Eventually, those professional sport teams that use data and derive analytic 
insights from available data sources in the most efficient way will gain a competitive 
advantage—one that ultimately might lead to superior sport and business performance.  
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